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ABSTRACT 
Does Merger and Acquisition Activity Play a Role in The Pre-Existing Healthcare 
Initiatives of Improved Quality and Decreased Costs Highlighted by The Affordable Care 
Act? 
by 
Dawn Constance Mckell 
July 18, 2016 
Chair: Conrad Ciccotello 
Major Academic Unit: Finance, Wealth Management 
This is a quantitative study of archival data that examines Merger and Acquisition 
(M&A) activity using currently established healthcare quality and financial performance 
metrics. The research seeks to explicate the relationship between M&A activity and 
M&A experience in the healthcare industry as it relates to initiatives aimed at improving 
the quality and decreasing the cost of healthcare. The Affordable Care Act (ACA) 
legislation appears to be contributing to a trend toward M&A consolidation; by 
illuminating how this trend potentially impacts healthcare quality and cost reduction 
initiatives, this study’s contribution is both useful and practical. The units of analysis are 
Medicare reporting hospitals, hospital systems, and related healthcare providers that have 
or have not experienced an M&A or multiple M&As. 
The study shows a statistically significant improvement in quality each year from 
2006–2014, which is reflected in higher scores for the four quality metrics measured. 
M&A activity, as measured by acquisition status and acquirer experience, did not appear 
to influence these quality metrics, with the exception of the heart failure measure, which 
 xiii 
showed a statistically significant positive influence of acquirer experience across all 
specifications.  
M&A activity’s possible effects on hospital financial performance was assessed 
through operating-cost-to-charge and capital-cost-to-charge ratios (CCRs). The operating 
CCR appears to be positively influenced by both acquisition status and acquirer 
experience, while the capital CCR was positively influenced only by acquirer experience. 
A positive influence is reflected in a decreasing ratio.  
Results on quality improvement over time, both before and after the ACA, 
suggest that the ACA itself may not be the driver for quality improvement. Similarly, 
decreases in OCCR occurred consistently and statistically significantly over time, both 
pre- and post-ACA, while CCCR showed statistically significant decreases in 2006–2008, 
2013, and 2014. These results appear to support the notion that the trend was ongoing 
before the ACA was enacted and gave these measures high-profile exposure. 
 
INDEX WORDS: Hospitals, Hospital consolidation, Mergers and Acquisitions, M&A, 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, ACA, Accountable Care 
Organization, ACO, Healthcare system, Organizational learning theory, EMR, 




I.1 Healthcare in the United States 
The current state of healthcare in the United States (US) is troublesome; the US 
spends more on healthcare per person than any other nation and more than two-and-half 
times what other developed nations spend (Kane, 2012) (Munro, 2015). Citing the US 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), Munro (2015) projected that the 
National Healthcare Expenditure (NHE) would “hit $3.207 trillion” in 2015, or $10,000 
per capita for the US population of approximately 320 million (Munro, 2015). In 2014, 
spending was $9,523 per capita, or 17.5 percent of the US gross domestic product (GDP) 
(Government, 2014). Yet, despite this generous spending, based on 2013 data from 11 
countries, the US ranks at the bottom when it comes to its overall health rankings on 
quality of care, access to care, efficiency, equity, and healthy lives (Davis, Stremikis, 
Squires, & Schoen, 2014, p. 7). These findings support earlier findings from 2004, 2006, 
2007, and 2010 (Davis et al., 2014). To address this problem, the Affordable Care Act 
(ACA), also known as “Obamacare,” was enacted in March 2010 and targeted three key 
healthcare factors: increasing access to care, improving the quality of care, and 
decreasing the cost. Since its enactment, the ACA is recognized as having contributed to 
both horizontal and vertical merger and acquisition (M&A) activity in the healthcare 
industry (Packer-Tursman, 2015). This M&A activity could be detrimental to the ACA’s 
goals. On the other hand, the ACA encourages integrating activities through provisions 
such as Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs), which aim to enhance control of the 
continuum of care, and value-based purchasing, which prompts consolidation efforts to 
cover more patients and reduce risk. This study explores whether M&A activity is 
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associated with two of the ACA’s three healthcare targets—improving quality and 
reducing costs—and, if so, whether the association is synergistic or antagonistic.  
I.2 M&A Activity Behavior and Observed Associations 
In general, the overarching goal of businesses that enter into the M&A arena has 
transformed from a desire to acquire new skills or perform new activities to a desire to 
realize “economies of scale” that are anticipated when companies in the same industry 
combine. This latter type of M&A might also be entered into to achieve synergies 
between organizations (Marmenout, 2011). 
It is well recognized that M&As occur in waves (Andrade, Mitchell, & Stafford, 
2001; Haleblian, Devers, McNamara, Carpenter, & Davison, 2009; Mitchell & Mulherin, 
1996), and that the waves themselves are clustered within given industries (Mitchell & 
Mulherin, 1996). In 2012 and 2013, the global value of M&As across industries was 
US$2.6 and US$2.4 trillion, respectively (Thomson-Reuters, 2012, 2013), yet abundant 
evidence shows that the results of M&As, based on expected performance, can be 
disappointing (Gomes, Angwin, Weber, & Tarba, 2013). In general, M&A studies deliver 
mixed results when tested by improvements to shareholder value (Tuch & O'Sullivan, 
2007). Half of M&As in the US and 70 percent of international M&As do not meet 
expectations and are therefore considered unsuccessful (Aguilera & Dencker, 2004). This 
information is supported by other reports on the high failure rate of M&As as cited in 
Stahl et al. (2013, p. 335, para 2) and others (Tuch & O'Sullivan, 2007). This 
phenomenon belies the repeated waves of M&A activity across industries; the global, 
upward trend in the number (Barkema & Schijven, 2008) and scale of M&As; and the 
apparent willingness of organizations and their stakeholders to incur the high cost that 
 3 
these ventures entail. Meta-analysis shows that strategic and financial variables are not 
significant when trying to predict post-acquisition success (King, Dalton, Daily, & Covin, 
2004). Some studies have looked at the post M&A performance of the acquired versus 
the acquirer and have found that the acquirer suffers financially (Chatterjee, 1992; Datta, 
Pinches, & Narayanan, 1992; King et al., 2004; Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2003; 
Seth, Song, & Pettit, 2002), while the acquired shows improved performance (Asquith & 
Kim, 1982; Datta et al., 1992; Hansen & Lott Jr, 1996; Malatesta, 1983). 
In the US, M&A activity in the healthcare industry was second only to that in the 
energy industry in 2012 and 2014 (Thomson-Reuters). Packer-Tursman (2015, p.21, 
chart) ranked healthcare number one in M&A activity (19.5 percent) across the top 20 
M&A,US industry business sectors. Healthcare industry M&As seem to follow general 
M&A trends. Hospital consolidations—a subset of healthcare industry M&As—
experienced a wave in the 1990s (Vogt 2006). Although it has not been investigated as 
such, another hospital consolidation wave seems to be occurring now based on hospital 
M&A activity reports (Brown, Werling, Walker, Burgdorfer, & Shields, 2012; KPMG, 
2015; Packer-Tursman, 2015; Sanders, 2015). Studies of hospital consolidation results 
have varied from mixed results (Cook, 2015; Dranove & Lindrooth, 2003; Krishnan & 
Krishnan, 2003) to cost savings that decrease over time (Harrison, 2011). Spang, 
Arnould, and Bazzoli (2009) point out that results “are very sensitive” to ownership, 
governance, and market structure. Cook (2015) reports lower net margins for both the 
acquired and the acquirer, with the acquirer experiencing higher patient margins post-
acquisition. On the quality side, Mutter, Romano, and Wong (2011) found inconsistent 
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results when studying the association between hospital consolidation and quality using 
quality data from 16 states for 1999 and 2000. 
Thus, the question is, given a sound business plan and thorough investigation of 
the organization to be acquired, why do so many M&As lead to outcomes that are below 
expectations? A prevailing thought here focuses on employee aspects, including morale, 
culture incongruence, and employee retention or turnover (Buono & Bowditch, 2003; 
d'Amours, 2010; Siehl & Smith, 1990). Marmenout (2011) suggests that, to achieve 
economies of scale, the new goal of M&As is greater integration of people, which in turn 
creates greater upheaval and uncertainty. Some argue that such upheaval and uncertainty 
impact both morale and turnover (Schweiger & Denisi, 1991; Seo & Hill, 2005). This 
line of thinking has generated considerable research on the human side of M&As. 
However, there has been less focus on the competence or experience of the executive 
team and/or the organization—though Johnson, Lenartowicz, and Apud (2006) do offer a 
model of cultural competence in international business. 
The crux of the matter is that the ACA legislation seems to be contributing to a 
rise in M&A activity, yet we find little to support the value of such activity; indeed, 
significant research from other industries suggests that most M&As are unsuccessful 
when compared to their intended objectives. 
I.3 Purpose of the Study 
This research addresses two questions: What association, if any, does horizontal 
acquisition have with the quality of hospital inpatient care and hospital efficiency? Is any 
potential association mitigated or enhanced by prior acquisition experience on the part of 
the acquirer? 
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I.3.1 Contribution to organizational learning theory. 
 Simply put, organizational learning theory predicts that the more an organization 
repeats the same task, the better it will perform that task (Crossan, Maurer, & White, 
2011). Another objective of my study is to peer through an organizational learning theory 
lens at M&A activity as it relates to the M&A experience of the acquiring entities. In a 
study based on panel data from 25 large Dutch multinational firms, Barkema and 
Schijven (2008) suggest that acquisition experience among members of the “top 
management team” might allow a firm to acquire more efficiently, but might also impede 
its ability to acquire more effectively by limiting its integration/restructuring activity. 
Integration intensity—i.e., the extent to which the acquiring firm incorporates the 
acquired firm into its operations at all levels and departments—has been shown to impact 
post-acquisition performance differentially based on whether the acquisition is focus 
increasing, as in horizontal M&As, or focus decreasing, as in vertical M&As. As cited in 
Daniliuc, Bilson, and Shailer (2014, p. 591), high integration intensity has proven 
beneficial when the acquisition’s strategic objectives are focus-increasing economies of 
scale, efficiency, and synergy (Salter & Weinhold, 1981); however, such intensity might 
be detrimental to focus-decreasing strategies aimed at financing or diversification 
(Shrivastava, 1986; Vestring, Rouse, & Rovit, 2004). Given M&A activity’s increasing 
emphasis on focus-increasing strategies (Marmenout, 2011), all of these findings suggest 
that acquisition experience might lead to an overemphasis on integration activities that is 
detrimental to achieving diversification goals (Barkema & Schijven, 2008). In general, 
outcomes measures such as integration intensity are consistent with focus-increasing 
strategic initiatives.  
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In the healthcare industry, M&A activity is occurring to consolidate hospitals—a 
focus-increasing strategy—while the M&A activity associated with the ACO structure 
being pursued is a focus-decreasing strategy. This might lead to the expectation that the 
acquirer’s experience would be beneficial in M&As involving hospital consolidation. 
Results from the current study provide evidence to support organizational learning theory 
in the healthcare industry related to focus-increasing strategies, but it sheds no light on 
focus-decreasing strategies. 
Economies of scale, margins, increased revenue, cost savings, and price decreases 
focus solely on financial performance measures. However, value in healthcare must 
consider quality care that drives patient outcomes. The increasing collection and 
publication of quality metrics within the healthcare industry suggest that quality is at least 
as important in the eyes of those who passed the legislation. Although quality metrics 
existed before the ACA, an emphasis on quality of care metrics is a key focus of the 
legislation. The ACA was signed into law by President Obama on March 23, 2010. The 
law was enacted to increase access to care, improve patient outcomes, and reduce the cost 
of care in the US (Whitehouse, 2012). The ACA has extended accountability for patient 
outcomes to a wider circle of providers who operate as a healthcare team. This has driven 
individual hospital, urgent care centers, community clinics, and physician’s offices 
toward increased M&A activity (Packer-Tursman, 2015).  
Several of the ACA payment reform initiatives are designed to push delivery 
systems to greater collaboration and integration. For example (and as stated earlier), the 
ACA includes provisions that encourage the formation of ACOs, and it offered financial 
incentives for early ACOs adopters. Thus, the M&A activity trend has been fueled in part 
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by two factors: the desire to achieve an ACO organizational structure, which is viewed as 
a best practice to address ACA initiatives; and the desire to gain control of the continuum 
of care. In addition, payment initiatives, such as value-based purchasing, prompt facilities 
to control more patient lives to reduce the risk of the higher healthcare costs associated 
with any one individual patient. Given the poor track record of M&As, it is important to 
learn how M&A activity might be associated with ACA initiatives so that practice and 
policy can be modified appropriately and organizational learning theory can be expanded. 
A review of the literature indicates that researchers have yet to publish a 
comprehensive study of all US hospital M&A activity using quality measures and 
Medicare financial metrics as indicators. Previous studies have used the American 
Hospital Association (AHA) annual hospital survey (Cuellar & Gertier, 2005; Ho & 
Hamilton, 2000), hospital inpatient data (Hayford, 2012), and all payer administrative 
data (Mutter et al., 2011) to evaluate M&A activity’s effect on quality. Further, the data 
sets used were pre-2007, which is before the ACA legislation was established, and the 
studies focused on a particular state, California (Hayford, 2012; Ho & Hamilton, 2000), a 
few states (Cuellar & Gertier, 2005), or a 16 state region, (Mutter et al., 2011). Thus, a 
gap in knowledge exists on the effect of M&As in the healthcare provider space, 
particularly as measured by the existing quality and efficiency metrics of performance 
and from a more current national standpoint. Bridging this gap is the final objective of 
this research.  
In summary, this study attempts to fill gaps in the literature and provide evidence 
that might help elucidate the relationships between M&A activity in the healthcare space, 
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quality and cost of care, and the M&A experience across the US as represented by the 
conceptual framework and study hypotheses in sections I.4.1 and I.4.2 below. 
I.3.2 Contribution to practice.  
This study is focused on hospital-to-hospital M&As. Therefore, focus-decreasing 
strategies or vertical M&As—i.e., diversification, such as the acquisition of long term 
acute care (LTAC) facilities, home health, and pharmacy acquisitions—is an area for 
future research. Again, as has been noted elsewhere, the literature in this area has utilized 
the performance measures of cost savings, price decreases, and revenue increases 
(Cuellar & Gertier, 2005; Ho & Hamilton, 2000) using varying methods, such as text 
analysis (Cook, 2015) and case studies (Romano & Balan, 2011; Thompson 2009). 
Researchers have also evaluated economies of scale cost savings and margins pre- and 
post-acquisition (Dranove & Lindrooth, 2003; Harrison, 2011; Krishnan & Krishnan, 
2003). In general, the measures are consistent with focus-increasing strategic initiatives, 
which a focal point of this research.  
Again, given the poor track record of M&As, “it is important to learn how M&A 
activity might be associated with ACA initiatives so that practice and policy can be 
modified appropriately” (p.7). For practice, this research provides guidance based on 
associations between M&A transactions, experience, and performance results based on 
the healthcare industry’s current performance markers.  
I.4 Expected Results 
I.4.1 Conceptual framework.  
Figure 1 shows the study’s conceptual framework and applied theory. 
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Figure 1 Conceptual Model 
M&A activity, organizational learning, and expected results 
I.4.2 Hypotheses.  
Assuming that other possible influencers are controlled for, this study posits the 
following hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1: Hospital-to-hospital acquisition or merger will improve the 
acquired hospital’s quality scores. 
Hypothesis 2: When the acquirer has prior acquisition experience, the acquired 
hospital’s quality scores will improve. 
Hypothesis 3: Hospital operating cost-per-charge ratios will decrease for 
hospitals that have been acquired.  
Hypothesis 4: Hospital operating cost-per-charge ratios will decrease for 
hospitals by an additional increment when the acquirer has prior acquisition 
experience.  
H1 + 
  M&A 
Activity 
 Quality of 
    Care 
  Cost of 
    Care 
    M&A 
Experience 
    M&A 
Experience 
H2 + 
H3 -, H5 - 
H4 -, H6 - 
Organizational Learning Theory (H2, H4, H6) 
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Hypothesis 5: Hospital capital cost-per-charge ratios will decrease for hospitals 
that have been acquired. 
Hypothesis 6: Hospital capital cost-per-charge ratios will decrease for hospitals 




To analyze unbalanced, archival panel data, I used Stata 14, applying descriptive 
statistics and a fixed effects multivariate regression statistical analysis with robust 
variance estimates and clustering around a unique identifier for each hospital. 
II.1 Research Methodology 
This analysis was conducted by assembling data on hospital characteristics for a 
10-year period (2005–2014). Most of this data was obtained from CMS.gov. M&A data 
was obtained from Bloomberg’s database, which contains information about M&As 
associated with both public and private healthcare providers; it also includes specifics on 
ownership, type of transaction, and other demographics. News sources related to public 
M&A announcements were used to determine the identify of individual hospitals when 
Bloomberg listed the transaction as “all assets of” and/or the listing contained only the 
number of hospitals acquired. Billian’s HealthData database (BHD) hospital 
identification numbers (bhid) were used as a unique identifier for each hospital reporting. 
This was essential, as many hospital provider numbers changed over time as hospitals 
transitioned to critical access sites. BHD’s hospital demographics were used to match the 
multiple providers to the bhid. The dependent variables are from the Medicare.gov and 
Centers for Medicare and Medicare Services (CMS) websites. Medicare.gov has four 
categories of measures—process, outcome, patient experience, and structure—for a total 
of 32 quality metrics that cover the quality of care in various disease states and quality 
improvement initiatives. Medicare quality metrics also changed over the study period. 
Here, I focus on four of the timely and effective care process measures because they were 
retained with the same description across the 10-year study period. Likewise, I use cost 
metrics from the CMS. It’s important to note that the quality results described here 
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pertain only to the quality measures studied; results may vary when other quality 
measures—such as patient satisfaction or population health outcome—are examined.  
II.2 Data Sets 
M&A data was obtained from the Bloomberg database on US hospital-related 
M&A transactions from 2005 to 2014. I used BHD to match provider numbers to the 
appropriate unique hospital identifier, as many hospitals used multiple provider numbers 
over the study period. Medicare.gov was the source for hospital-reported quality metrics 
(all US hospitals) from 2005 to 2014, while operating and capital cost-to-charge ratios 
were obtained from cms.gov. The ratios are calculated by dividing total hospital 
operating or capital costs by the sum of inpatient and outpatient charges. 
II.2.1 Billians HealthData data.  
Individual hospitals, integrated healthcare networks (IDNs), ACOs, health 
systems (HSs), and group purchasing organizations (GPO) data sets were downloaded 
from the BHD for hospital and healthcare market research at 
www.billianshealthdata.com. Table 1 shows 2015 BHD definitions for GPOs, IDNs, and 
HSs. For this study, these facility types were individually researched to identify the 
acquired’s and the acquirer’s facility type at the time of the M&A transaction. 
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Table 1 Type of Facility Definitions 
 
Hospital demographics included in the data sets are found in Appendix A.1—Billians 
Health Data Demographics. I used these data sets to assign bhid to acquired and 
acquiring hospitals, IDNs, ACOs, HSs, and GPOs. I used “Multi-hospital” to tag 
transactions that involved more than one acquired hospital when the hospitals were not 
part of any of the identified provider groups. I used “Hospital” to tag the acquirer when 
the acquirer was a standalone hospital. These distinctions created two dummy variables: 
in the first, 0 = a single hospital acquisition and 1 = multi-hospital transaction; in the 
second, 0 = a hospital or multi-hospital acquirer that was not identified as an HS, IDN, 
ACO, or GPO, and 1 = an acquirer that was identified as an HS, IDN, ACO, or GPO.
II.2.2 Bloomberg data.  
Data was extracted from Bloomberg using four criteria— “MA,” “Consumer 
Non-cyclical,” “Healthcare Services,” and “Medical–Hospital”—and entered into an 
Excel spreadsheet. Information for each transaction included deal type, announce date, 
target name, acquirer and seller names, announced total value (in millions, when 
available), payment type, total value over earnings before interest, taxes and amortization 
Definitions of healthcare providers other than single hospital entities 
Tag Definition 
IDN An IDN is a network that includes the entire continuum of care. It is geographic in 
nature and includes hospitals, nursing homes, assisted-living facilities, pharmacies, 
clinics, and outpatient clinics. It is the often called the birth to death scenario. 
ACO An ACO is a healthcare organization characterized by a payment and care delivery 
model that seeks to tie provider reimbursements to quality metrics and reductions in the 
total cost of care for an assigned patient population. An ACO includes doctors, 
hospitals, and other health care providers. 
HS A healthcare system is not necessarily geographic in nature and it includes only 
hospitals. 
GPO A GPO is created to leverage the collective buying power of a group of businesses 
using volume to receive higher discounts from vendors. 
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(TV/EBITA), and deal status. The Bloomberg data did not contain the TV/EBITA data 
for all transactions, but this variable was not used in the study. The initial data set 
contained 820 observations, each reflecting an acquisition or merger during the study 
period. Each line item was compared to a BHD data set that included all hospitals in the 
BHD to assign the current, appropriate bhid to both the target and the acquirer. During 
this process, I recognized that some Bloomberg line items were transactions that included 
multiple hospital and health system purchases. I therefore expanded these lines so that 
each hospital had its own line, with the appropriate bhid. The transaction date and all 
other Bloomberg data were copied into the new lines. It was often necessary to research 
the acquisition announcements to ensure that the correct identifier was assigned to each 
hospital. As described earlier, I added an additional demographic to tag individual 
hospital transactions, versus multi-hospital and health system transactions. Currently 
closed hospitals were also noted. Data cleanup included the removal of investment (INV) 
and joint venture (JV) transactions, transactions that were withdrawn or terminated, and 
transactions that did not include general, medical, or surgical hospitals or health systems 
with general, medical, or surgical hospitals—that is, I omitted transactions that only 
included Long term acute care (LTAC) facilities, skilled nursing facilities (SNFs),  or 
specialty hospitals. Additionally, I removed transactions that were completed by 
purchasers that were not IDNs, ACOs, HSs, GPOs, or standalone general, medical, or 





II.2.3 Data accuracy checks. 
 Individual searches were triangulated with BHD and Bloomberg data as to what 
was and was not a health care system, ACO, GPO, or IDN. Searches were conducted on 
acquisition announcements to verify Bloomberg data and identify individual hospitals 
when Bloomberg identified the acquisition as a multi-site acquisition. Finally, I 
researched acquisitions to find out whether or not facilities considered the transaction a 
merger or joint venture. 
II.2.4 Medicare data—quality.  
Medicare.gov data from 2005 to 2014 were downloaded from 
https://data.medicare.gov/data/hospital-compare (see Table 2).  
Table 2 Medicare Data Files Content 
Data categories from Medicare data files  
Hospital—general information 
Structural measures 
Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers 
and Systems (HCAHPS) patient satisfaction survey  
Healthcare associated infections 
Timely and effective care (TEC)  
Readmissions, complications, and deaths 
Readmissions reduction 
Outpatient imaging efficiency 
Medicare volume 
Medicare spending per patient 
Medicare spending per patient 
 
Demographics and measures included in the data sets can be found in Appendix 
A.2—Medicare Data Set Demographics. Acronyms used in the measure names are listed 
in Appendix A.3—Medicare Acronyms, while each data set’s components are listed in 
Appendix A.4—Medicare Data Set Components. The timely and effective care (TEC) 
measures can be found in Appendix A.5—Medicare Data Set Components—Timely and 
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Effective Care. Note that not all TEC measures are available for all years. I used only 
those variables that were reported consistently year-to-year, which left one variable for 
each of four disease or prevention categories—heart attack, heart failure, pneumonia, and 
surgical infection prevention—defined below. The surgical infection measure reporting 
was discontinued during the final year of the study. The master data set compiled the 
hospital provider information by hospital identifier and year; Table 3 below describes the 
variables, which are further described in Chapter III, Results. 
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Table 3 Study Variables – Protocol and Data Sources 




Variable Name Variable Description Origin of Measure  Source: Years Available Comments: 
Dependent 
Variables 
Ami 8a Score Heart attack treatment quality 
measure 
Percent of patients given percutaneous 
coronary intervention (PCI) within 120 
minutes of arrival (or 90 minutes from 2008 
on)  
Medicare Compare 2005–2014 Data taken from source 
HF_1 Score Heart failure treatment quality 
measure 
Percent of patients given discharge 
instructions 
Medicare Compare 2005–2014 Data taken from source 
PN_6 Score Pneumonia treatment quality 
measure 
Percent of patients given the most 
appropriate initial antibiotic(s) 
Medicare Compare 2005–2014 Data taken from source 
SCIP_INF_1 Score Surgical infection prevention 
quality measure 
Percent of patients given antibiotics 1 hour 
before surgical incision 
Medicare Compare 2005–2013 This measure was dropped in 
2014 
CCCR Capital cost-to-charge ratio 
efficiency measure 
Capital investments divided by total 
inpatient and outpatient charges 
CMS Impact Files 2005–2014 (VA is not in the 
data set; it does not report this) 
Data taken from source 
OCCR Operating cost-to-charge ratio 
efficiency measure 
Operating costs divided by total inpatient 
and outpatient charges 
CMS Impact Files 2005–2014 (VA is not in the 
data set; it does not report this) 




Acquired Hospital acquisition status  One variable. Never acquired = 0; Acquired 
= 1; variable becomes 1 after acquisition and 
remains 1 for subsequent study years 
Bloomberg and individual, personal 
web research on the acquirers and the 
acquisition 
2005–2014 M&A transactions with 
acquisition dates 
Acquirer experience Acquirer with at least one 
acquisition prior to the current 
event and during the study period  
One variable. No experience = 0; At least 
one prior acquisition = 1 
Bloomberg and individual personal 
web research on the acquirers and the 
acquisition 





Hospital ID Medicare provider identification 
number and Billians HealthData 
ID (bhid) 
Identification numbers used to link quality 
and efficiency reports back to the 
appropriate hospital 
Medicare reports and Billians 
HealthData database 
2015: bhid; 2005–2014: 
provider numbers 
bhid used to associate single 
hospital with multiple provider 
numbers 
Total beds Total number of hospital beds Total number of hospitals beds listed on the 
certificate of need 
CMS Provider of Service files 2006–2014 Data taken from source—used 
log10 transformation 
Type of deal—single 
entity 
acquisition/multiple 
Transaction was the purchase of a 
single hospital or multiple 
hospitals 
One variable. Single hospital acquisition = 
0; Multiple hospital acquisition = 1 
Bloomberg and individual personal 
web research on the acquirers and the 
acquisitions 




or larger  
Acquirer was a single hospital 
versus a hospital system or larger 
One variable. Single hospital acquirer = 0; 
Health system or larger acquirer = 1 
Bloomberg and individual personal 
web research on the acquirers and the 
acquisitions 
2005–2014 Data taken from source 
Acute care Hospital type   CMS Hospital Data   2005–2014 Data taken from source 
Population percent 
urban 
Percent of population living in an 
urban area by county 
Numerical value  US Census Bureau  2010 Data taken from source 
Acquired* population 
percent urban 
Interaction term Interaction term between categorical 
"acquired" variable and continuous 
population percent variable 
    Interaction term—created in 
Stata 14 
Government—federal Hospital ownership 
 
CMS Hospital Data 2005–2014 Data taken from source 
Government—hospital 
district or authority 
Hospital ownership   CMS Hospital Data 2005–2014 Data taken from source—
omitted variable 
Government—local Hospital ownership   CMS Hospital Data 2005–2014 Data taken from source 
Government—state Hospital ownership   CMS Hospital Data 2005–2014 Data taken from source 
Proprietary Hospital ownership   CMS Hospital Data 2005–2014 Data taken from source 
Teaching Affiliated with a resident program One variable. Hospital with no Graduate 
Medical Education (GME) Part A payments 
= 0; Hospital with Graduate Medical 
Education (GME) Part A payments = 1 
CMS Cost Reports 2006–2014 Data taken from source and 
converted to dummy variable 
Voluntary nonprofit—
Other 




Hospital ownership   CMS Hospital Data 2005–2014 Data taken from source 
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If hospitals had changed names and/or provider ID numbers, I used the initial 
provider number to identify the new hospital name and/or provider ID. Typically, this 
information came from the American Hospital Directory at www.aha.com. Another 
source of this information was www.cms.gov. I then checked the new hospital name 
and/or provider ID against the hospital name, provider ID, and/or address in the BHD. 
For purposes of this study, I considered hospitals “Closed” when they no longer qualified 
as acute care facilities—that is, they had been converted to surgical or urgent care centers 
and no longer provided services for inpatients. This resulted in unbalanced panel data as 
not every hospital has data for the full 10-year study period. As I stated 
earlier and as Figure 2 shows, fewer TEC measures exist in the early years, but they 
gradually increased before decreasing precipitously in 2013 as measures were added in 
other areas. 
 
Figure 2 Number of Timely and Effective Care Measures by Year 






















II.2.5 Medicare data—financial.  
Financial data was obtained from CMS Cost Reports at www.cms.gov. These cost 
reports include hospital demographic information such as urban versus rural location, 
number of beds, type of hospital, and whether or not the hospital is a teaching facility. I 
obtained inpatient and outpatient hospital charges and total hospital cost data from CMS 
CSTS_CHRGS Reports by year. Teaching hospitals were identified as those receiving 
Graduate Medical Education (GME) payments using the CMS IME_GME 2005–2014 
reports. The hospital operating cost-to-charge and capital cost-to-charge ratios for each 
year were obtained from the CMS Final Rule Impact report (FY_yr?_FR_Impact_File). A 
list of all data available in the CMS cost reports and impact files can be found in 
Appendix A.6—Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Reports. 
II.2.6 Percent of urbanized population data.  
As an external control, I include a measure of urbanization. The percent urbanized 
population data was obtained from the 2010 United States Census found at 
https://www.census.gov/geo/reference/ua/ualists_layout.html. I matched the data to the 
appropriate bhid by county name and state. 
II.3 Data Compilation 
To analyze the data, I used Stata version 14. Variables included in the study and 
their nature are listed in Table 4 below. I also created dummy variables for each year 
(2006–2014) in which 0 equaled the data point that did not come from that year, and 1 





Table 4 contains the variable names, descriptions, and the nature of the data. I 
then present the results of the descriptive statistics analysis of the data, followed by the 
fixed-effect, multivariate regression analyses of the dependent variables. 
Table 4 Description and Nature of the Variables 
The nature of the study data 
Variable Name Variable Description Nature of Data 
ami 8a Heart attack treatment Percent score 
hf_1 Heart failure treatment Percent score 
pn_6 Pneumonia treatment Percent score 
scip_inf_1 Surgical infection prevention  Percent score 
Cccr Capital cost-to-charge ratio Ratio 
Occr Operating cost-to-charge ratio Ratio 
acquired Hospital acquired at least once  Dummy variable 
acqexp Acquirer with at least one acquisition 
prior to the current event within the 
study period 
Dummy variable 
bhid Billians HealthData ID  ID number used for clustering 
lg10beds Total number of hospital beds 
transformed by log 10 
Continuous variable 
typeofdeal Transaction was the purchase of a single 
hospital or multiple hospitals 
Dummy variable 
acquirertype  Acquirer was a single hospital versus a 
hospital system or larger 
Dummy variable 
acute Acute care hospital type Dummy variable 
poppct_urban Percent of population living in an urban 
area by county 
Continuous variable 
IacqXpoppc_1 Interaction term—acquired x 
poppct_urban 
Variable created in Stata 14 




Hospital District or 
Authority 
Federal government hospital ownership 
type 
Omitted variable 
govlocal Local government hospital ownership 
type 
Dummy variable 
Govstate State government hospital ownership 
type 
Dummy variable 
Proprietary Proprietary hospital ownership type Dummy variable 
Gme Proxy for teaching hospital type  Dummy variable 





Voluntary nonprofit other hospital 
ownership type 
Omitted variable 





III.1 Descriptive Statistics 
III.1.1 Data Notes. 
 Items of note that pertain to the data are listed below. 
o The acquired variable was a 0 for the acquired hospital prior to 
acquisition and became 1 and remained 1 for each subsequent study 
year after acquisition. 
o Merger and acquisition experience is defined as having acquired a 
hospital or multiple hospitals, within the study period, at least one year 
prior to the current M&A event.  
o An M&A event is defined as the Bloomberg M&A announcement date. 
o 2006–2013 Bloomberg M&A data was used in the study for the M&A 
experience variable.  
o 2005 Bloomberg M&A data was used to determine the 2006 M&A 
experience.  
o 2014 Bloomberg M&A data was not used in the study, because the 
M&A event’s effect might not be evident in such a short time period. 
o The study used four TEC quality metrics: heart attack (AMi 8a), heart 
attack, heart failure (HF-1_), pneumonia (PN_6), and surgical infection 
prevention (SCIP-inf-1). These four measures were chosen because 
they remained consistent throughout the study period, based on the 
measure definitions. The codes for the measures changed over time, but 
the basic definitions for the measures did not. Fortunately, there was 
consistent data on, and thus a measure for, each of the four clinical 
conditions (heart attack, heart failure, pneumonia, and surgical 
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infection) monitored for quality in the TEC portion of the ACA metrics. 
However, surgical infection prevention was not reported in 2014, so its 
study data runs from 2006–2013. 
o Although TEC measures for 2005–2014 were collected, I did not use 
the data for 2005, as an examination of the frequencies suggested that a 
considerable number of hospitals may not have been reporting it 
correctly. Because this was the first year of reporting the measures, it 
was reasonable to conclude that reporting errors might be an issue.  
III.1.2 Descriptive statistical analysis.  
Table 5 offers a descriptive analysis of the variables. In addition to the categories 
listed, the “acute” category contained 41,401 observations, with 31,716 observations 
(76.6 percent) from acute hospitals and 9,685 observations (23.4 percent) from non-acute 
hospitals. 
Table 5 Variables—Descriptive Statistics 
Key study and control variables  
Key Study Variables: Quality Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Heart attack treatment 13,408 80.60 21.87 0 100 
Heart failure treatment 34,949 77.33 25.58 0 100 
Pneumonia treatment 35,905 88.36 11.96 0 100 
Surgical infection prevention 28,150 87.38 20.29 0 100 
Key Study Variables: Cost-to-Charge Ratios Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Operating ratio 36,346 0.37 0.16 0 1 
Capital ratio 36,337 0.03 0.02 0 0 
Control Variables: Structure and Urbanization Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Percent of population that is urban 46,696 66.91 30.74 0 100 
IacqXpopp~1 |- interaction term 41,118 1.49 11.10 0 100 
log10 total hospital beds 43,922 2.01 0.52 0 3.39 
Total number of hospital beds 43,922 192.61 231.48 1 2449 




Control Variables of Interest 
acquired Freq. Percent Cum. 
0 43,996 98.03 98.03 
1 882 1.97 100 
Total 44,878 100  
    
acqexp Freq. Percent Cum. 
0 44,366 98.86 98.86 
1 512 1.14 100 
Total 44,878 100  
    
typeofdeal Freq. Percent Cum. 
0 44,364 98.85 98.85 
1 514 1.15 100 
Total 44,878 100  
    
acquirertype Freq. Percent Cum. 
0 44,350 98.82 98.82 
1 528 1.18 100 
Total 44,878 100   
  
Control Variables—Teaching Status and Ownership Type 
GME (teaching) Freq. Percent Cum. 
0 37,367 83.26 83.26 
1 7,511 16.74 100 
Total 44,878 100 
 
    
Government—federal Freq. Percent Cum. 
0 39,619 96.99 96.99 
1 1,230 3.01 100 
Total 40,849 100 
 
    
Government—local Freq. Percent Cum. 
0 37,237 91.16 91.16 
1 3,612 8.84 100 
Total 40,849 100 
 
    
Government—state Freq. Percent Cum. 
0 40,204 98.42 98.42 
1 645 1.58 100 
Total 40,849 100 
 




    
    
Control Variables—Teaching Status and Ownership Type (cont) 
Proprietary Freq. Percent Cum. 
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0 33,946 83.1 83.1 
1 6,903 16.9 100 
Total 40,849 100 
 
Vol* nonprofit church Freq. Percent Cum. 
0 36,600 89.6 89.6 
1 4,249 10.4 100 
Total 40,849 100 
 
Vol* nonprofit private Freq. Percent Cum. 
0 27,377 67.02 67.02 
1 13,472 32.98 100 
Total 40,849 100 
 


















III.1.2.1 Timely and effective care.  
Control Variables—Fixed Effects 
yr_2006 Freq. Percent Cum. 
0 39,887 88.88 88.88 
1 4,991 11.12 100 
Total 44,878 100      
yr_2007 Freq. Percent Cum. 
0 39,895 88.9 88.9 
1 4,983 11.1 100 
Total 44,878 100  
yr_2008 Freq. Percent Cum. 
0 39,892 88.89 88.89 
1 4,986 11.11 100 
Total 44,878 100  
yr_2009 Freq. Percent Cum. 
0 39,892 88.89 88.89 
1 4,986 11.11 100 
Total 44,878 100      
yr_2011 Freq. Percent Cum. 
0 39,892 88.89 88.89 
1 4,986 11.11 100 
Total 44,878 100      
yr_2012 Freq. Percent Cum. 
0 39,891 88.89 88.89 
1 4,987 11.11 100 
Total 44,878 100      
yr_2013 Freq. Percent Cum. 
0 39,892 88.89 88.89 
1 4,986 11.11 100 
Total 44,878 100      
yr_2014 Freq. Percent Cum. 
0 39,892 88.89 88.89 
1 4,986 11.11 100 
Total 44,878 100  
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Of the TEC measures, the pneumonia measure had the highest mean percentage 
score overall, followed by the surgical infection prevention measure, the heart attack 
measure, and the heart failure measure. 
III.1.2.2 Mergers and acquisitions.  
There was a total of 43,996 observed TEC score data points for hospitals that had 
never been acquired, comprising 98 percent of the data set. Of the total number of 
observations for acquired hospitals (882), the number of observations for hospitals whose 
acquirers had prior acquisition experience was 512 (58 percent) as outline in Table 5. In 
terms of the type of acquisition (deal) and acquirer type—where 0 is a single hospital 
acquisition or a single hospital acquirer, and 1 is a multiple hospital acquisition or a 
hospital system (or larger) acquirer—there were 514 observations for deal types that 
included multiple acquisitions in the transaction, and 528 observations whose acquirer 
had prior acquisition experience (as defined in III.1.1 above). 
III.1.2.3  Teaching status and type of ownership.  
Teaching hospitals represented 16.7 percent of the observations. For ownership 
type, observations were for federal government (3 percent), local government (8.8 
percent), state government (1.6 percent), proprietary (16.9 percent), voluntary nonprofit 
church (10.9 percent), and voluntary nonprofit proprietary (33 percent). Two other 




III.1.2.4 Year-to-year potential contribution.  
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Table 5 also includes a list of the number of hospital scores that could contribute 
to the key study variables (TEC scores) for each year. These are the fixed-effect 
variables, and 2010 was omitted from the data set. 
III.2 Bloomberg Data  
Table 6 presents the M&A activity identified for 2005–2014. 
Table 6 Hospital Merger and Acquisition Activity 
M&A Activity 2005-2014 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total 
Number of 
mergers per year 13 14 16 14 8 23 19 23 18 21 169 
Total number of 
hospitals 
acquired per year 18 21 79* 16 9 39 25 30 36 29 302 
Number of 
hospitals   
acquired by a 
health system or 





transactions 8 9 67 3 1 21 11 10 24 14 168 
*Triad bought out by Community Health Systems (50 hospitals) 
  
The data collected for the study period, 2005–2014, indicates that there were 169 
transactions involving 302 hospitals. Hospitals that were acquired by a health system (or 
larger) acquirer composed 91.1 percent of hospitals acquired, and hospitals acquired in a 
multi-hospital acquisition transaction constituted 55.6 percent of the total number of 
hospitals acquired. In 2007, a large acquisition occurred when Triad Hospitals, Inc., was 
acquired by Community Health Systems for a reported $5.1 billion, with the assumption 
of $1.7 billion in debt (Reuters, 2007). This deal accounts for the spike in the number of 
hospitals acquired in the year-to-year pattern of mergers/number of hospitals acquired 
illustrated in Figure 3 below.  
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Figure 3 M&A Activity Trend 
M&A activity 2005–2014 
The number of M&As, year-to-year, shows a rise and fall pattern, with a 
precipitous dip in 2008–2009. An overall increasing trend is also exhibited.  
III.3 Dependent Variables Fixed-Effects Multivariate Linear Regressions 
The heart attack treatment metric in Table 7 below (and in Table 8, Table 11, and 
Table 12) reflects the linear regression models. These estimate the effect of the key study 
variables on quality measure scores with yearly fixed effects and robust variance 
estimates, clustered on hospital identifiers, using unbalanced panel data. 
III.3.1 Heart attack measure results.  
Note that the number of hospitals reporting the heart attack treatment metric is 
lower than the other quality metrics used in this study and identified previously. The 
scores reflect the percent of patients who received percutaneous coronary intervention 












2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Number of mergers per year Number of hospitals acquired per year
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Table 7 Linear Regression—Heart Attack Metric 
Patients given PCI within 120 minutes of arrival (90 minutes from 2008 forward)  
 
As Table 7 shows, the number of heart attack measure score observations was 12,560. 
The linear model statistically significantly predicted the heart attack measure F(23, 1784) 
= 196.18, p < .0001, adj. R2 = 0.3917. The independent variables of interest and the 
control variables contributed to the model as follows. 
The independent variables of interest—the acquired and acquirer experiences—
showed no statistically significant association with the rate at which hospitals comply 
Linear Regression 
Number of obs     = 12,560 
F(23, 1784)       = 196.18 
Prob > F          = 0.000 
R-squared         = 0.3928 
Adj R-squared   = 0.3917 
Root MSE          = 16.73 
   (Std. Err. adjusted for 1,785 clusters in bhid) 
ami8a Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
acquired -12.72662 11.79525 -1.08 0.281 -35.86058 10.40734 
acqexp -2.838257 3.225408 -0.88 0.379 -9.164232 3.487718 
typeofdeal 5.554889 2.820259 1.97 0.049 0.023531 11.08625 
acquirertype 1.059501 3.043925 0.35 0.728 -4.910533 7.029534 
_IacqXpoppc_1 0.0724331 0.127966 0.57 0.571 -0.1785459 0.3234121 
yr_2006 -20.60652 0.6750504 -30.53 0.000 -21.9305 -19.28255 
yr_2007 -27.65433 0.6996349 -39.53 0.000 -29.02652 -26.28214 
yr_2008 -18.27975 0.600212 -30.46 0.000 -19.45694 -17.10256 
yr_2009 -8.332939 0.4950388 -16.83 0.000 -9.303855 -7.362022 
yr_2011 2.288315 0.4096183 5.59 0.000 1.484933 3.091697 
yr_2012 7.305264 0.430533 16.97 0.000 6.460862 8.149666 
yr_2013 8.795362 0.4473937 19.66 0.000 7.917891 9.672833 
yr_2014 9.769084 0.4324858 22.59 0.000 8.920852 10.61732 
lg10beds 2.845558 1.083649 2.63 0.009 0.720203 4.970913 
gme -0.9318023 0.5607219 -1.66 0.097 -2.031543 0.1679385 
acute 27.68363 5.323134 5.20 0.000 17.24339 38.12386 
govfed -3.20802 3.210428 -1.000 0.318 -9.504615 3.088576 
govlocal -2.964386 1.865703 -1.59 0.112 -6.62358 0.6948081 
govstate -7.28275 2.284713 -3.19 0.001 -11.76375 -2.801755 
proprietary -0.2696232 0.8801481 -0.31 0.759 -1.995853 1.456607 
volnpchurch 0.9500298 0.8447864 1.12 0.261 -0.7068453 2.606905 
volnpprivate 0.8178927 0.6893982 1.19 0.236 -0.5342202 2.170006 
poppct_urban 0.0302107 0.0196375 1.54 0.124 -0.0083041 0.0687256 
cons 48.74991 6.295224 7.74 0.000 36.40312 61.0967 
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with the standard of care for heart attacks, i.e., neither the acquisition nor the acquirer’s 
experience level appear to be associated with the heart attack quality measure score. As I 
mentioned in this section’s introduction, the type of deal is associated with statistical 
significance in a positive direction at the p = .049 level. 
Acute hospitals and state government hospitals also showed statistically 
significant differences for this measure, at the p < .001 and p = .001 levels, respectively, 
but the associations appear to be in a positive and negative direction. Table 7 shows the 
regression coefficients and robust standard errors. 
III.3.2 Heart failure measure results.  
The number of heart failure measure score observations was 32,424. As Table 8 
shows, the linear model statistically significantly predicted the heart failure measure 
F(23, 4322) = 313.27, p < .0001, adj. R2 = 0.2980. The independent variables of interest 
and the control variables contributed to the model as follows. 
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Table 8 Linear Regression—Heart Failure Metric 
Patients given discharge instructions  
Linear Regression 
Number of obs     = 32,424 
F(23, 4322)       = 313.27 
Prob > F          = 0.000 
R-squared         = 0.2985 
Adj R-squared   = 0.2980 
Root MSE          = 21.24   






t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Acquired -2.423556 6.025032 -0.400 0.688 -14.23571 9.388597 
Acqexp 6.721845 1.792033 3.750 0.000 3.208541 10.23515 
typeofdeal 0.7069767 1.458687 0.480 0.628 -2.152797 3.566751 
acquirertype 2.310082 1.25887 1.840 0.067 -0.1579483 4.778113 
_IacqXpoppc_1 -0.0144046 0.0586405 -0.250 0.806 -0.12937 0.1005608 
yr_2006 -27.69362 0.5167001 -53.600 0.000 -28.70662 -26.68062 
yr_2007 -16.78175 0.423625 -39.610 0.000 -17.61227 -15.95122 
yr_2008 -11.60703 0.3833527 -30.280 0.000 -12.3586 -10.85546 
yr_2009 -5.33518 0.326057 -16.360 0.000 -5.974419 -4.695941 
yr_2011 2.466811 0.2484433 9.930 0.000 1.979734 2.953887 
yr_2012 6.553876 0.3152296 20.790 0.000 5.935865 7.171888 
yr_2013 8.567035 0.3357005 25.520 0.000 7.90889 9.22518 
yr_2014 4.384875 0.4474191 9.800 0.000 3.507704 5.262046 
lg10beds 14.64436 0.8958431 16.350 0.000 12.88805 16.40068 
Gme -2.720609 0.4824544 -5.640 0.000 -3.666467 -1.774751 
Acute 0.6070405 1.026111 0.590 0.554 -1.404663 2.618744 
Govfed -5.900751 2.079944 -2.840 0.005 -9.978508 -1.822993 
Govlocal -1.845393 0.9914804 -1.860 0.063 -3.789204 0.098417 
Govstate -6.683951 2.181061 -3.060 0.002 -10.95995 -2.407953 
proprietary 1.791398 0.6919657 2.590 0.010 0.4347904 3.148006 
volnpchurch 4.867107 0.6662679 7.310 0.000 3.56088 6.173334 
volnpprivate 2.363699 0.5563827 4.250 0.000 1.272903 3.454494 
poppct_urban 0.0125811 0.0121725 1.03 0.301 -0.0112831 0.0364454 
Cons 49.19412 1.468609 33.5 0.000 46.31489 52.07335 
 
 
The heart failure measure results provide evidence of greater compliance with the 
measure associated with hospitals whose acquirers had experience with at least one 
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acquisition prior to the current acquisition (p < .001). This was the only TEC measure to 
show a consistent significant difference when it came to acquisition experience. The 
statistical significance seen for teaching status (gme), at the p < .001 level, would suggest 
that teaching hospitals would have lower scores on this measure. In contrast to the heart 
attack measure, the acute hospital variable exhibits no statistical significance related to 
the heart failure measure, but the state government variable remains statistically 
significant in the same negative direction (as seen for the heart attack metric) while 
federal government ownership becomes statistically significant, also in a negative 
direction, at the p = .005 level. Conversely, proprietary, voluntary not-for-profit church 
and voluntary not-for-profit private ownerships are statistically significant, in a positive 
direction, at the p = .01, < .001, and < .001 levels, respectively, while they were not 
significant with the heart attack measure. 
After examining a correlation matrix that contained all of the target variables (see 
Appendix B.1 Correlation Matrix—All Variables) I found that both the type of deal and 
acquirer type variables had unacceptable levels of correlation to the acquired dependent 
variable. Further, the deal type variable alone correlated unacceptably to the acquisition 
experience variable.  When the deal type variable was omitted, the statistically significant 
positive association of acquisition status with the heart failure measure was still present at 
the p < .001 level. Table 9 shows the full regression for the adjusted heart failure quality 
measure model. In the same matrix, the acquired and acquirer experience also correlated 




 Table 9 Heart Failure Quality Measure—Deal Type Variable Excluded 
Patients given discharge instructions  
Linear Regression      
Number of obs     = 32,843      
F(23, 4322)       = 309.17      
Prob > F          = 0.000      
R-squared         = 0.2984      
Root MSE          = 21.241      
  (Std. Err. Adjusted for 4,323 clusters in bhid) 
hf_1 Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
acquired -1.32 5.73 -0.23 0.818 -12.55 9.91 
acqexp 6.74 1.89 3.57 0.000 3.04 10.45 
acquirertype 2.56 1.32 1.93 0.053 -0.04 5.15 
_IacqXpoppc_1 -0.02 0.06 -0.37 0.711 -0.13 0.09 
locacq -1.16 1.59 -0.73 0.468 -4.28 1.96 
yr_2006 -27.60 0.52 -52.74 0.000 -28.63 -26.57 
yr_2007 -16.88 0.43 -39.39 0.000 -17.72 -16.04 
yr_2008 -11.66 0.39 -29.82 0.000 -12.43 -10.90 
yr_2009 -5.36 0.33 -16.19 0.000 -6.01 -4.71 
yr_2011 2.43 0.25 9.66 0.000 1.94 2.92 
yr_2012 6.48 0.32 20.47 0.000 5.86 7.11 
yr_2013 8.55 0.34 25.21 0.000 7.88 9.21 
yr_2014 4.35 0.45 9.61 0.000 3.46 5.23 
lg10beds 14.55 0.90 16.24 0.000 12.79 16.31 
Gme -2.71 0.48 -5.62 0.000 -3.65 -1.76 
Acute 0.61 1.03 0.60 0.550 -1.40 2.63 
Govfed -5.94 2.08 -2.86 0.004 -10.02 -1.87 
Govlocal -1.75 0.99 -1.77 0.076 -3.69 0.19 
govstate -6.68 2.18 -3.06 0.002 -10.95 -2.40 
proprietary 1.73 0.69 2.49 0.013 0.37 3.09 
volnpchurch 4.83 0.67 7.25 0.000 3.52 6.14 
volnpprivate 2.32 0.56 4.17 0.000 1.23 3.41 
poppct_urban 0.01 0.01 1.10 0.272 -0.01 0.04 
_cons 49.40 1.47 33.63 0.000 46.52 52.28 
 
 
As Table 10 below shows, removing both the deal and acquirer type variables did 
not eliminate the statistical significance associated with the heart failure metric when it 





Table 10 Heart Failure Variable without Type of Deal and Acquirer Type 
Patient given discharge instructions 
Linear Regression      
Number of obs = 32,843      
F(22, 4322) = 323.23      
Prob > F = 0.000      
R-squared = 0.2983      
Root MSE = 21.241      
  (Std. Err. adjusted for 4,323 clusters in bhid) 
hf_1 Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
acquired -0.16 5.59 -0.03 0.977 -11.13 10.80 
acqexp 6.12 1.87 3.28 0.001 2.46 9.79 
_IacqXpoppc_1 -0.01 0.06 -0.24 0.809 -0.13 0.10 
locacq -0.91 1.57 -0.58 0.559 -3.98 2.16 
yr_2006 -27.60 0.52 -52.75 0.000 -28.63 -26.58 
yr_2007 -16.86 0.43 -39.35 0.000 -17.70 -16.02 
yr_2008 -11.68 0.39 -29.86 0.000 -12.44 -10.91 
yr_2009 -5.37 0.33 -16.22 0.000 -6.02 -4.72 
yr_2011 2.43 0.25 9.67 0.000 1.94 2.92 
yr_2012 6.49 0.32 20.49 0.000 5.87 7.11 
yr_2013 8.54 0.34 25.19 0.000 7.88 9.21 
yr_2014 4.34 0.45 9.6 0.000 3.45 5.22 
lg10beds 14.54 0.90 16.23 0.000 12.79 16.30 
gme -2.70 0.48 -5.61 0.000 -3.64 -1.76 
acute 0.62 1.03 0.6 0.548 -1.40 2.63 
govfed -5.94 2.08 -2.86 0.004 -10.01 -1.87 
govlocal -1.75 0.99 -1.77 0.076 -3.69 0.19 
govstate -6.68 2.18 -3.06 0.002 -10.95 -2.40 
proprietary 1.72 0.69 2.47 0.014 0.35 3.08 
volnpchurch 4.83 0.67 7.25 0.000 3.52 6.14 
volnpprivate 2.32 0.56 4.17 0.000 1.23 3.42 
poppct_urban 0.01 0.01 1.11 0.269 -0.01 0.04 
_cons 49.40 1.47 33.64 0.000 46.52 52.28 
 
III.3.3 Pneumonia measure results.  
Table 11 shows regression results, which include robust standard errors, for the 
pneumonia TEC measure. The number of pneumonia measure score observations was 
33,343. The linear model statistically significantly predicted the pneumonia measure 
F(23, 4451) = 369.67, p < .0001, adj. R2 = 0.2103. The independent variables of interest 
and the control variables contributed to the model as follows. 
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Table 11 Linear Regression – Pneumonia Metric 
Patients given the most appropriate initial antibiotic(s) 
Linear Regression 
     
Number of obs     = 33,343      
F(23, 4451)       = 369.67      
Prob > F          = 0.000      
R-squared         = 0.2109      
Adj R-squared   = 0.2103      
Root MSE          = 10.323      
   (Std. Err. adjusted for 4,452 clusters in bhid) 
pn_6 Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
acquired 2.343025 1.528689 1.53 0.125 -0.6539666 5.340016 
acqexp -0.4309394 0.5944132 -0.72 0.469 -1.596285 0.734406 
typeofdeal 1.444043 0.5870582 2.46 0.014 0.2931173 2.594969 
acquirertype -0.1082617 0.5349054 -0.2 0.840 -1.156942 0.9404187 
_IacqXpoppc_1 -0.0228923 0.0157844 -1.45 0.147 -0.0538375 0.008053 
yr_2006 -10.74737 0.2460084 -43.69 0.000 -11.22966 -10.26507 
yr_2007 -8.056926 0.2412555 -33.4 0.000 -8.529906 -7.583945 
yr_2008 -2.752042 0.211239 -13.03 0.000 -3.166175 -2.337908 
yr_2009 -2.470575 0.2512603 -9.83 0.000 -2.96317 -1.97798 
yr_2011 0.9797937 0.1576626 6.21 0.000 0.6706966 1.288891 
yr_2012 3.235939 0.1752545 18.46 0.000 2.892353 3.579525 
yr_2013 3.534861 0.1857065 19.03 0.000 3.170784 3.898938 
yr_2014 4.987877 0.1708667 29.19 0.000 4.652893 5.32286 
lg10beds 2.129235 0.3079039 6.92 0.000 1.52559 2.732879 
gme -0.8354693 0.1838526 -4.54 0.000 -1.195912 -0.4750268 
acute -0.0626553 0.3552465 -0.18 0.860 -0.7591149 0.6338044 
govfed -0.7706866 0.6090393 -1.27 0.206 -1.964706 0.4233333 
govlocal -0.5702633 0.376496 -1.51 0.130 -1.308383 0.167856 
govstate -1.717775 0.5663929 -3.03 0.002 -2.828187 -0.6073634 
proprietary 0.4961415 0.2643138 1.88 0.061 -0.0220448 1.014328 
volnpchurch 1.442783 0.2387014 6.04 0.000 0.9748095 1.910756 
volnpprivate 0.9247121 0.2097734 4.41 0.000 0.5134519 1.335972 
poppct_urban 0.0306212 0.0047168 6.49 0.000 0.0213739 0.0398685 
cons 83.21924 0.5497255 151.38 0.000 82.14151 84.29698 
 
 
 The deal type variable showed a statistically significant difference, p = .014, 
which suggests that transactions that involve multiple hospitals are associated with an 
increase in pneumonia measure scores. As with the previous two measures, the 
statistically significant negative association of state government ownership appears to 
persist here. Similar to the heart failure measure, voluntary nonprofit church and 
voluntary nonprofit private ownerships exhibit statistically significant positive 
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associations. Unlike the heart failure measure, and like the heart attack measure, no 
significant difference appears when hospitals are owned by federal government entities. 
In a departure from the heart attack and heart failure results, urbanization (poppct_urban) 
appears to have a statistically significant positive association here at the p < .001 level.  
III.3.4 Surgical infection prevention measure results. 
 Table 12 shows regression results for the surgical infection measure. The number 
of surgical infection prevention measure score observations was 26,113. The linear model 
statistically significantly predicted the surgical infection prevention measure F(22, 4254) 
= 314.46, p < .0001, adj. R2 = 0.1987. The independent variables of interest and the 
control variables contributed to the model as follows. 
In contrast with other TEC measures—where no statistical significance was 
seen—acquisition exhibited a statistically significant (p = .035) negative association with 
the surgical infection measure. Acquirer type, on the other hand, appears to be associated 
with a statistically significant positive influence at the p = .045 level. As with the heart 
attack measure, for the surgical infection prevention measure, acute status shows a 
statistically significant difference at the p < .001 level; here, however, acute status takes 
an opposite (negative) direction. Ownership by the federal government appears to result 
in a statistically significant (p= .001) negative association with scores as it did with the 
heart failure measure. State government ownership no longer displays a statistically 
significant difference as it did with all of the other TEC measures. Voluntary nonprofit 
church and voluntary nonprofit private ownership show statistical significance at the p = 
.004 level for both. 
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Table 12 Linear Regression—Surgical Infection Prevention Metric 
Antibiotics given 1 hour before surgical incision 
Linear Regression       
Number of obs     = 26,113      
F(22, 4254)       = 314.46      
Prob > F          = 0.000      
R-squared         = 0.1994      
Adj R-squared   = 0.1987      
Root MSE          = 17.934      
   (Std. Err. adjusted for 4,255 clusters in bhid)  
scip_inf_1 Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
acquired -9.580302 4.534921 -2.11 0.035 -18.47111 
-
0.6894911 
acqexp 2.240669 1.17916 1.9 0.057 -0.0710993 4.552437 
typeofdeal 0.2956308 1.037629 0.28 0.776 -1.738664 2.329925 
acquirertype 2.11415 1.052553 2.010 0.045 0.0505967 4.177703 
_IacqXpoppc_1 0.0849851 0.0505017 1.680 0.092 -0.0140247 0.1839948 
yr_2006 -17.86073 0.4375643 -40.820 0.000 -18.71858 -17.00287 
yr_2007 -12.88735 0.3230468 -39.890 0.000 -13.52069 -12.25401 
yr_2008 -8.899963 0.2944722 -30.220 0.000 -9.477282 -8.322644 
yr_2009 -17.3041 0.5929411 -29.180 0.000 -18.46658 -16.14163 
yr_2011 1.196452 0.1817135 6.580 0.000 0.8401991 1.552705 
yr_2012 3.182899 0.2001037 15.910 0.000 2.790592 3.575207 
yr_2013 3.673741 0.1997581 18.390 0.000 3.282111 4.065371 
yr_2014 0 (omitted)*     
lg10beds 4.48712 0.4587359 9.780 0.000 3.587758 5.386481 
gme 0.3553823 0.3278293 1.08 0.278 -0.2873342 0.9980987 
acute -2.080949 0.5972306 -3.48 0.000 -3.251833 
-
0.9100657 
govfed -3.108888 0.9608239 -3.24 0.001 -4.992605 -1.225172 
govlocal 0.2768383 0.5844783 0.47 0.636 -0.8690441 1.422721 
govstate -1.534209 1.12001 -1.37 0.171 -3.730014 0.6615961 
proprietary 
-
0.7640291 0.4470341 -1.71 0.088 -1.640449 0.1123909 
volnpchurch 1.27366 0.4382464 2.91 0.004 0.4144683 2.132851 
volnpprivate 1.031344 0.3541928 2.910 0.004 0.3369409 1.725746 
poppct_urban 0.0143724 0.0077061 1.87 0.062 -0.0007357 0.0294804 
cons 84.63078 0.9004386 93.99 0.000 82.86545 86.39611 




When I omitted the deal and acquirer type variables from the regression (see 
Table 13 below), based on the unacceptable level of correlation previously discussed 
(section III.3.2), the statistically significant negative association of acquisition status with 
the surgical infection measure was still evident at the p = .037 level. 
Table 13 Surgical Infection Prevention Measure Without Deal and Acquirer Type 
Antibiotics given 1 hour before surgical incision 
Linear Regression 
     
Number of obs     = 26,450      
F(21, 4254)       = 326.95      
Prob > F          = 0.000      
R-squared         = 0.2      
       
  (Std. Err. Adjusted for 4,255 clusters in bhid) 
scip_inf_1 Coef. Robust Std. Err. T P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
acquired -8.94 4.30 -2.08 0.037 -17.37 -0.52 
acqexp 1.80 1.22 1.47 0.141 -0.60 4.20 
_IacqXpoppc_1 0.09 0.05 1.93 0.054 0.00 0.19 
locacq 1.26 0.78 1.61 0.107 -0.27 2.80 
yr_2006 -18.02 0.45 -40.32 0.000 -18.89 -17.14 
yr_2007 -12.87 0.32 -40.00 0.000 -13.50 -12.24 
yr_2008 -8.97 0.30 -30.00 0.000 -9.56 -8.39 
yr_2009 -17.33 0.60 -29.11 0.000 -18.49 -16.16 
yr_2011 1.19 0.18 6.57 0.000 0.83 1.54 
yr_2012 3.16 0.20 15.94 0.000 2.77 3.55 
yr_2013 3.65 0.20 18.31 0.000 3.26 4.04 
yr_2014 0.00 (omitted due to collinearity) 
lg10beds 4.37 0.46 9.59 0.000 3.48 5.27 
gme 0.35 0.33 1.07 0.285 -0.29 1.00 
acute -1.98 0.60 -3.32 0.001 -3.15 -0.81 
govfed -3.10 0.96 -3.22 0.001 -4.98 -1.21 
govlocal 0.20 0.59 0.34 0.731 -0.95 1.35 
govstate -1.54 1.12 -1.38 0.168 -3.73 0.65 
proprietary -0.80 0.45 -1.80 0.073 -1.68 0.07 
volnpchurch 1.24 0.44 2.83 0.005 0.38 2.10 
volnpprivate 0.99 0.35 2.80 0.005 0.30 1.68 
poppct_urban 0.02 0.01 2.00 0.046 0.00 0.03 
_cons 84.76 0.90 94.60 0.000 83.01 86.52 
 
 
 Again, as discussed in section III.3.2, in the same matrix, the acquired and the 
acquirer experience variables correlated at an unacceptable level. When the acquirer 
experience variable was removed along with the deal and acquirer type variables, the 
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result was no longer statistically significant, which suggests some interaction. This 
regression is shown in Table 14 below. 
Table 14 Surgical Infection Prevention Measure Without Acquirer Experience and 
Deal and Acquirer Type 
Antibiotics given 1 hour before surgical incision 
Linear Regression 
     
Number of obs     = 26,450      
F(20, 4254)       = 343.16      
Prob > F          = 0.000      
R-squared         = 0.1999      
Root MSE          = 17.933      
  
(Std. Err. adjusted for 4,255 clusters in bhid) 
scip_inf_1 Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
acquired -7.41 4.04 -1.83 0.067 -15.33 0.51 
_IacqXpoppc_1 0.09 0.05 1.83 0.068 -0.01 0.18 
locacq 1.07 0.79 1.35 0.178 -0.49 2.62 
yr_2006 -18.02 0.45 -40.35 0.000 -18.90 -17.15 
yr_2007 -12.86 0.32 -39.96 0.000 -13.49 -12.23 
yr_2008 -8.97 0.30 -29.98 0.000 -9.56 -8.38 
yr_2009 -17.32 0.60 -29.09 0.000 -18.49 -16.15 
yr_2011 1.19 0.18 6.56 0.000 0.83 1.54 
yr_2012 3.16 0.20 15.94 0.000 2.77 3.55 
yr_2013 3.59 0.19 18.74 0.000 3.21 3.96 
yr_2014 0.00 (omitted due to collinearity) 
lg10beds 4.38 0.46 9.60 0.000 3.49 5.27 
gme 0.34 0.33 1.04 0.300 -0.30 0.99 
acute -1.97 0.60 -3.31 0.001 -3.14 -0.80 
govfed -3.10 0.96 -3.22 0.001 -4.98 -1.21 
govlocal 0.20 0.59 0.35 0.730 -0.95 1.35 
govstate -1.54 1.12 -1.38 0.169 -3.73 0.65 
proprietary -0.79 0.45 -1.76 0.079 -1.67 0.09 
volnpchurch 1.23 0.44 2.82 0.005 0.38 2.09 
volnpprivate 0.99 0.35 2.81 0.005 0.30 1.69 
poppct_urban 0.02 0.01 2.00 0.045 0.00 0.03 
_cons 84.75 0.90 94.52 0.000 82.99 86.51 
 
 
III.3.5 Operating cost-to-charge ratio measure results.  
The number of operating cost-to-charge ratio observations was 28,183 (see Table 
15). 
For this measure, I omitted observations for the acute indicator due to collinearity. 
The linear model statistically predicted a significant difference in operating cost-to-
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charges, F(22, 3330) = 136.60, p < .0001, adj. R2 = 0.2949. The independent variables of 
interest and the control variables contributed to the model as follows. 
Table 15 Linear Regression—Operating Cost-to-Charge Ratio Metric 
Hospital operating costs divided by the sum of in and outpatient charges 
Linear Regression       
Number of obs     = 28,183      
F(22, 3330)       = 136.6      
Prob > F          = 0.000      
R-squared         = 0.2955      
Adj R-squared   = 0.2949      
Root MSE          = 0.12576      
   (Std. Err. adjusted for 3,331 clusters in bhid) 
opccr Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
acquired -0.0850736 0.0298857 -2.85 0.004 -0.1436699 -0.0264774 
acqexp -0.0400228 0.0152475 -2.62 0.009 -0.0699182 -0.0101274 
typeofdeal -0.0015831 0.017075 -0.09 0.926 -0.0350617 0.0318955 
acquirertype 0.0030921 0.0126339 0.240 0.807 -0.0216789 0.027863 
_IacqXpoppc_1 0.0011743 0.000387 3.030 0.002 0.0004155 0.0019331 
yr_2006 0.033588 0.0019563 17.170 0.000 0.0297524 0.0374236 
yr_2007 0.0236001 0.0018617 12.68 0.000 0.0199499 0.0272503 
yr_2008 0.0129841 0.0016203 8.01 0.000 0.0098072 0.0161609 
yr_2009 0.0045208 0.0013624 3.320 0.001 0.0018496 0.007192 
yr_2011 -0.0040741 0.0014164 -2.880 0.004 -0.0068512 -0.0012969 
yr_2012 -0.0209336 0.0014623 -14.320 0.000 -0.0238006 -0.0180665 
yr_2013 -0.0293004 0.0016601 -17.650 0.000 -0.0325554 -0.0260454 
yr_2014 -0.0341596 0.0017406 -19.630 0.000 -0.0375723 -0.0307469 
lg10beds -0.1203741 0.0058785 -20.48 0.000 -0.1318999 -0.1088484 
gme 0.0204394 0.0043348 4.72 0.000 0.0119403 0.0289386 
acute 0 (omitted)     
govfed -0.0428425 0.0130269 -3.290 0.001 -0.0683841 -0.0173009 
govlocal 0.0496296 0.0085636 5.800 0.000 0.0328392 0.0664201 
govstate 0.0826154 0.0168629 4.900 0.000 0.0495528 0.1156781 
proprietary -0.1057231 0.0051711 -20.45 0.000 -0.1158619 -0.0955842 
volnpchurch -0.026208 0.0061093 -4.290 0.000 -0.0381864 -0.0142296 
volnpprivate 0.0087718 0.004854 1.810 0.071 -0.0007454 0.018289 
poppct_urban -0.001044 0.0000915 -11.41 0.000 -0.0012234 -0.0008645 
cons 0.7151059 0.0126593 56.49 0.000 0.6902851 0.7399266 
 
 
Acquisition and acquirer experience appear to be associated with lower operating 
cost-to-charge ratios in a statistically significant way at the p = .004 and p = .009 levels, 
respectively, while the deal and acquirer types show no statistical significance. 
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The interaction term indicating the acquisition’s urbanicity is associated with a 
positive cost-to-charges ratio (p = .002). Local government or state government 
ownership appears to be associated with a higher ratio in a statistically significant way at 
the p < .001 level, as does teaching status (p < .001). Federal government (p = .001), 
proprietary (p < .001), and voluntary nonprofit church (p < .001) ownerships and 
urbanization (p <.001) each have a statistically significant association with a lower 
operating cost-to-charges ratio. 
III.3.6 Capital cost-to-charge ratio measure results.  
As Table 16 shows, the number of capital cost-to-charge ratio observations was 
28,177. The linear model statistically significantly predicted the cost-to-charge ratio 
F(22, 3330) = 46.99, p < .0001, adj. R2 = 0.1429. The independent variables of interest 
and the control variables contributed to the model as follows. 
Acquisition showed no significance, but acquirer experience appears to be 
associated with a statistically significant decline in the capital cost-to-charge ratio (p = 
.001). The type of deal or acquirer and the acquisition/urbanization interaction term did 
not return statistically significant results. 
Year-over-year showed a statistically significant decrease in the capital cost-to-
charge ratio with the exception of 2009 and 2011. As with operating cost-to-charge ratio 
results, bed size showed a statistically significant lowering of the capital cost-to-charge 
ratio at the p < .001 level. Federal government (p < .001), proprietary (p < .001), and 
voluntary nonprofit church (p < .001) ownerships were associated with a statistically 
significant lowering of the capital cost-to-charge ratio. Urbanization also resulted in a 
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decrease in the ratio at a statistical significance level of p = .006, while local government 
ownership was related to an increase in the ratio at a significance level of p = .001. 
 
Table 16 Linear Regression—Capital Cost-to-Charge Ratio Metric 
Hospital capital expenditures divided by the sum of in- and outpatient charges 
Linear Regression       
Number of obs     = 28,177      
F(22, 3330)       = 46.99      
Prob > F          = 0.000      
R-squared         = 0.1436      
Adj R-squared   = 0.1429      
Root MSE          = 0.01656      
       
   (Std. Err. adjusted for 3,331 clusters in bhid) 
cpccr Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
acquired -0.002328 0.0035374 -0.66 0.511 -0.0092636 0.0046077 
acqexp -0.005473 0.0016808 -3.26 0.001 -0.0087684 -0.0021775 
typeofdeal 0.0008998 0.0017319 0.52 0.603 -0.0024959 0.0042956 
acquirertype -0.0000566 0.0016337 -0.030 0.972 -0.0032597 0.0031465 
_IacqXpoppc_1 0.000045 0.0000443 1.020 0.310 -0.0000418 0.0001318 
yr_2006 0.0032509 0.000332 9.79 0.000 0.0026 0.0039018 
yr_2007 0.001482 0.0002935 5.05 0.000 0.0009066 0.0020574 
yr_2008 0.0005824 0.0002548 2.29 0.022 0.0000828 0.001082 
yr_2009 -0.0002996 0.0002099 -1.43 0.153 -0.0007111 0.0001118 
yr_2011 0.0001719 0.0002256 0.76 0.446 -0.0002704 0.0006143 
yr_2012 -0.0005404 0.0002468 -2.19 0.029 -0.0010243 -0.0000564 
yr_2013 -0.0006828 0.0002916 -2.340 0.019 -0.0012546 -0.000111 
yr_2014 -0.0009886 0.000323 -3.06 0.002 -0.0016218 -0.0003554 
lg10beds -0.0142996 0.00079 -18.1 0.000 -0.0158485 -0.0127507 
gme 0.0001808 0.0004636 0.390 0.697 -0.0007281 0.0010897 
acute 0 (omitted)     
govfed -0.0059867 0.0012807 -4.67 0.000 -0.0084978 -0.0034756 
govlocal 0.0037835 0.0011189 3.380 0.001 0.0015896 0.0059774 
govstate -0.0000934 0.0013728 -0.070 0.946 -0.0027850 0.0025983 
proprietary -0.0040045 0.0006808 -5.88 0.000 -0.0053393 -0.0026697 
volnpchurch -0.0025419 0.0006603 -3.85 0.000 -0.0038366 -0.0012472 
volnpprivate 0.0008459 0.0005522 1.530 0.126 -0.0002369 0.0019286 
poppct_urban -0.0000308 0.0000112 -2.75 0.006 -0.0000527 -0.0000089 




III.4 Consolidated linear regression results—quality and efficiency.  
Table 17 below provides the coefficients and p values for the dependent variables 
in a consolidated format, with an additional control variable that serves as a proxy for 
local acquisition, as I discuss later in section III.5.2. 
Table 17 Consolidated Results Table 
Dependent, independent and control variable consolidated results 
Measures of Quality Measures of Efficiency 
  ami8a hf_1 pn_6 scip_inf_1 opccr Cpccr 
Variable Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| 
acquired -16.24 0.197 -1.60 0.783 2.30 0.128 -9.79 0.023 -0.08 0.007 0.00 0.902 
acqexp -5.18 0.089 6.50 0.000 -0.31 0.609 2.17 0.056 -0.05 0.002 -0.01 0.001 
typeofdeal 6.51 0.026 0.94 0.513 1.46 0.014 0.42 0.684 0.00 0.871 0.00 0.449 
acquirertype 2.27 0.494 2.47 0.062 -0.08 0.881 1.86 0.075 0.00 0.770 0.00 0.927 
locacq -5.94 0.018 -1.16 0.467 0.35 0.460 1.07 0.174 0.00 0.945 0.00 0.859 
yr_2006 -20.54 0.000 -27.60 0.000 -10.75 0.000 -18.01 0.000 0.03 0.000 0.00 0.000 
yr_2007 -27.74 0.000 -16.87 0.000 -8.06 0.000 -12.88 0.000 0.02 0.000 0.00 0.000 
yr_2008 -18.42 0.000 -11.66 0.000 -2.79 0.000 -8.96 0.000 0.01 0.000 0.00 0.025 
yr_2009 -8.32 0.000 -5.36 0.000 -2.45 0.000 -17.32 0.000 0.01 0.000 0.00 0.212 
yr_2011 2.32 0.000 2.43 0.000 1.00 0.000 1.19 0.000 0.00 0.010 0.00 0.453 
yr_2012 7.28 0.000 6.49 0.000 3.24 0.000 3.16 0.000 -0.02 0.000 0.00 0.096 
yr_2013 8.65 0.000 8.55 0.000 3.57 0.000 3.65 0.000 -0.03 0.000 0.00 0.026 
yr_2014 9.80 0.000 4.35 0.000 5.00 0.000 **  ** -0.03 0.000 0.00 0.003 
lg10beds 2.55 0.019 14.55 0.000 2.19 0.000 4.38 0.000 -0.12 0.000 -0.01 0.000 
gme -0.83 0.142 -2.71 0.000 -0.83 0.000 0.34 0.294 0.02 0.000 0.00 0.779 
acute 26.92 0.000 0.62 0.549 -0.08 0.817 -1.98 0.001 0.00 * 0.00 * 
govfed -3.65 0.308 -5.94 0.004 -0.78 0.198 -3.10 0.001 -0.04 0.001 -0.01 0.000 
govlocal -2.92 0.117 -1.76 0.076 -0.54 0.148 0.20 0.733 0.05 0.000 0.00 0.001 
govstate -7.33 0.001 -6.68 0.002 -1.71 0.003 -1.54 0.168 0.08 0.000 0.00 0.958 
proprietary -0.33 0.712 1.72 0.013 0.45 0.096 -0.80 0.075 -0.10 0.000 0.00 0.000 
volnpchurch 0.88 0.306 4.83 0.000 1.43 0.000 1.23 0.005 -0.03 0.000 0.00 0.000 
volnpprivate 0.84 0.228 2.32 0.000 0.91 0.000 0.99 0.005 0.01 0.069 0.00 0.129 
poppct_urban 0.03 0.088 0.01 0.273 0.03 0.000 0.02 0.047 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.007 
IacqXpoppc_1 0.13 0.337 -0.02 0.703 -0.02 0.116 0.09 0.075 0.00 0.002 0.00 0.718 
constant 50.03 0.000 49.40 0.000 83.17 0.000 84.76 0.000 0.71 0.000 0.06 0.000 
Number of 
observations 12,560 33,343 26,113 26,113 28,183 28,177 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.3917 0.2109 0.1994 0.1987 0.2955 0.1429 
* Omitted due to collinearity           
** Not reported in 2014           
III.4.1 Quality measures.  
Across the independent variables of interest that reflect measures of quality 
(TEC), I found no statistically significant differences between hospitals that had been 
acquired versus those that had not; the only exception was with the surgical infection 
prevention measure. In that case, acquisition appeared to be associated with a statistically 
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significant negative effect (lower compliance with surgical infection protocols or lower 
quality) on scores at the p = .04 level. When comparing hospitals whose acquirers had 
experience to hospitals whose acquirers had no prior experience (as defined in this study), 
I found no significant differences in any of the TEC measures studied. Hospitals acquired 
as part of a multi-hospital deal had a statistically significant greater compliance with the 
heart attack standard of care (p = .05) and with the pneumonia quality compliance 
(p=.01), although this result did not remain consistent across other quality or efficiency 
measures. Being acquired by a health system was associated with higher compliance with 
the surgical infection prevention measure (p = .05).  
The size of the hospital, in terms of the number of beds represented by the 
log10beds variable, appears to matter for all TEC measures; all show a statistically 
significant positive difference, with significance levels of p = .009 (heart attack), p = .001 
(heart failure), p = .001 (pneumonia), and p = .001 (surgical infection prevention). 
III.4.2 Efficiency Measures.  
In general, the efficiency measures—the operating cost-to-charge and capital cost-
to-charge ratios—had a somewhat different pattern. Acquisition was associated with a 
lower operating cost-to-charge ratio at a significance level of p = .004, while acquirer 
experience was associated with lower operating and capital cost-to-charge ratios at 
significance levels of p = .009 and .001, respectively. Neither deal type nor acquirer type 
had a statistically significant effect on the operating or capital cost-to-charge ratio. 
Additional details on control variables can be found in sections IV, Table 27, and the 
following section (III.5).  
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III.5 Other Specifications—Fixed-Effects Multivariate Linear Regressions 
To further explore results related to the operating cost-to-charge ratio and capital 
cost-to-charge ratio observations, I created two correlation matrices (see Appendix B) 
and ran additional specifications to evaluate year-over-year percent changes in Medicare 
reported hospital costs (chgincost) and inpatient (chgininpatient) and outpatient 
(chginoutpatient) charges by facility. In addition, acquisitions involving acquirers and the 
acquired who belonged to the same Core Base Statistical Area (CBSA), as defined by 
CMS, were distinguished from those that did not as a proxy for local acquisition 
proximity (locacq) in order to access market variability. Table 18 below provides a 
description of the additional variables analyzed. 
Table 18 Description of Variables—Other Specifications 
Additional variables analyzed 
Variable Name Variable Description Nature of Data 
chgincosts 
Percent change in hospital costs reported to 
CMS year-over-year by facility 
Percent change 
chgininpatient 
Percent change in hospital inpatient charges 
reported to CMS year-over-year by facility 
 Percent change 
chginoutpatient 
Percent change in hospital outpatient 
charges reported to CMS year-over-year by 
facility 
 Percent change 
locacq Acquirer and acquired are from same CSBA Dummy variable 
 
 
III.5.1 Percent change in hospital costs and inpatient and outpatient charges.  
Note that the variables cited in this section exhibited unacceptably high 
correlation values both with and without the deal and acquirer type variables (see Table 
28 and Table 29, respectively; for the correlation matrices, see Appendix B). However, 
this does not affect the analyses in Table 19–Table 21 below, as the individual models do 
not include the variables together in one model.  
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Table 19 shows the percent change in hospital costs linear regression, with 31,481 
observations. The linear model statistically significantly predicted the percent change in 
hospital costs F(21, 4177) = 11.25, p < .0001, R2 = 0.0013. Given the R2, this model 
would be a very weak predictor of change in hospital costs. 
The independent variables of interest and acquired and acquirer experiences 
showed no statistically significant association with the percent change in hospital costs 
year-over-year. 
Table 19 Percent Change in Costs Year-over-Year by Facility 
Percent change in hospital costs 2005–2014 
Linear Regression      
Number of obs     = 31,481      
F(21, 4177)       = 11.25      
Prob > F          = 0.000      
R-squared         = 0.0013      
Root MSE          = 4.7524      
  
(Std. Err. Adjusted for 4,178 clusters in bhid) 
Chgincost Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Acquired 0.32 0.39 0.82 0.414 -0.45 1.09 
Acqexp -0.02 0.07 -0.27 0.789 -0.16 0.12 
_IacqXpoppc_1 0.00 0.00 -0.43 0.665 -0.01 0.01 
yr_2006 0.12 0.05 2.75 0.006 0.04 0.21 
yr_2007 0.12 0.04 3.05 0.002 0.04 0.19 
yr_2008 0.28 0.20 1.44 0.151 -0.10 0.67 
yr_2009 0.15 0.10 1.49 0.137 -0.05 0.34 
yr_2011 0.05 0.04 1.33 0.184 -0.02 0.13 
yr_2012 -0.02 0.02 -1.30 0.194 -0.06 0.01 
yr_2013 0.01 0.02 0.31 0.758 -0.03 0.05 
yr_2014 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.985 -0.05 0.05 
lg10beds 0.06 0.08 0.83 0.409 -0.09 0.21 
gme 0.01 0.01 0.52 0.604 -0.02 0.03 
acute -0.29 0.19 -1.54 0.124 -0.65 0.08 
govfed 0.04 0.07 0.62 0.536 -0.10 0.19 
govlocal 0.24 0.27 0.91 0.363 -0.28 0.77 
govstate 0.03 0.04 0.65 0.519 -0.06 0.11 
proprietary 0.07 0.05 1.45 0.148 -0.03 0.18 
volnpchurch 0.02 0.05 0.41 0.682 -0.07 0.11 
volnpprivate 0.00 0.05 -0.10 0.919 -0.10 0.09 
poppct_urban 0.00 0.00 -1.38 0.166 -0.01 0.00 




Table 20 contains the linear regression for percent change in hospital inpatient 
charges year-over-year. This model does not predict statistically significant changes in 
inpatient charges F(21, 4406) = 0.53, p = p < .962, R2 = 0.0019.  
Table 20 Percent Change in Inpatient Charges Year-over-Year by Facility 
Percent change in hospital inpatient charges 2005–2014 
Linear Regression      
Number of obs     = 35,703      
F(21, 4406)       = 0.53      
Prob > F          = 0.962      
R-squared         = 0.0019      
Root MSE          = 1137.5      
  (Std. Err. Adjusted for 4,407 clusters in bhid) 
       
chgininpatient Coef. Robust Std. Err.  T P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
acquired -53.84 29.79 -1.81 0.071 -112.24 4.57 
acqexp 39.64 24.65 1.61 0.108 -8.68 87.96 
_IacqXpoppc_1 0.22 0.15 1.43 0.152 -0.08 0.51 
yr_2006 1.17 1.09 1.08 0.282 -0.96 3.30 
yr_2007 0.30 0.74 0.40 0.690 -1.16 1.75 
yr_2008 0.28 0.70 0.40 0.687 -1.08 1.64 
yr_2009 0.05 0.68 0.07 0.947 -1.29 1.38 
yr_2011 -1.57 1.26 -1.24 0.214 -4.04 0.90 
yr_2012 3.16 1.96 1.61 0.107 -0.69 7.01 
yr_2013 82.52 52.64 1.57 0.117 -20.68 185.71 
yr_2014 -0.87 2.73 -0.32 0.749 -6.22 4.47 
lg10beds -5.26 4.77 -1.10 0.270 -14.62 4.09 
gme -11.19 11.03 -1.01 0.310 -32.81 10.43 
acute 30.75 16.04 1.92 0.055 -0.69 62.19 
govfed 371.94 186.88 1.99 0.047 5.56 738.32 
govlocal -20.89 19.38 -1.08 0.281 -58.89 17.11 
govstate -17.92 20.84 -0.86 0.390 -58.77 22.93 
proprietary -24.64 25.10 -0.98 0.326 -73.84 24.57 
volnpchurch -18.46 21.15 -0.87 0.383 -59.94 23.01 
volnpprivate -21.73 22.18 -0.98 0.327 -65.22 21.76 
poppct_urban -0.22 0.17 -1.26 0.206 -0.55 0.12 
_cons 15.26 11.14 1.37 0.171 -6.58 37.10 
 
 
The model in Table 21 is also a very weak predictor based on the R2, although it 
does predict a statistically significant change in outpatient charges year-over-year 
F(21,4401), p < .001, R2 = .0145. 
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Table 21 Percent Change in Outpatient Charges Year-over-Year by Facility 
Percent change in hospital outpatient charges 2005–2014 
Linear Regression 
     
Number of obs     = 35,655      
F(21, 4401)       = 5.38      
Prob > F          = 0.000      
R-squared         = 0.0145      
Root MSE          = 4.1484      
  (Std. Err. Adjusted for 4,402 clusters in bhid) 
       
chginoutpatient Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
acquired -0.21 0.17 -1.23 0.218 -0.55 0.12 
acqexp 0.18 0.11 1.64 0.100 -0.03 0.38 
_IacqXpoppc_1 0.00 0.00 1.26 0.209 0.00 0.00 
yr_2006 0.10 0.02 6.39 0.000 0.07 0.13 
yr_2007 0.07 0.02 3.26 0.001 0.03 0.11 
yr_2008 0.05 0.02 2.81 0.005 0.02 0.09 
yr_2009 0.03 0.01 2.71 0.007 0.01 0.05 
yr_2011 0.01 0.01 1.11 0.269 -0.01 0.04 
yr_2012 0.00 0.01 0.26 0.794 -0.02 0.02 
yr_2013 0.37 0.18 2.08 0.038 0.02 0.72 
yr_2014 -0.04 0.03 -1.39 0.163 -0.09 0.02 
lg10beds -0.25 0.09 -2.78 0.005 -0.43 -0.07 
gme 0.06 0.03 1.97 0.049 0.00 0.12 
acute 0.31 0.13 2.49 0.013 0.07 0.56 
govfed 4.81 2.22 2.16 0.031 0.45 9.16 
govlocal -0.02 0.01 -1.55 0.121 -0.04 0.00 
govstate 0.16 0.11 1.38 0.168 -0.07 0.38 
proprietary 0.04 0.02 2.12 0.034 0.00 0.07 
volnpchurch 0.03 0.02 1.39 0.165 -0.01 0.07 
volnpprivate 0.02 0.01 2.14 0.032 0.00 0.04 
poppct_urban 0.00 0.00 -1.35 0.177 0.00 0.00 
_cons 0.39 0.11 3.59 0.000 0.18 0.60 
 
 
Table 19–Table 21 are consolidated in Table 22 below. As the table shows, there 
were very few statistically significant differences associated with the variables in the 
percent change-in-cost and inpatient charges.   
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Table 22 Year-over-Year Changes in Cost and Charges by Facility 
Consolidated hospital costs and inpatient and outpatient charges 
  chgincost chgininpatient chginoutpatient 
Variable Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| 
acquired 0.19 0.535 -54.25 0.071 -0.24 0.174 
acqexp 0.04 0.680 39.84 0.113 0.19 0.075 
typeofdeal 0.04 0.567 1.10 0.823 0.01 0.798 
acquirertype 0.24 0.139 0.02 0.997 0.05 0.315 
locacq 0.02 0.606 2.29 0.650 0.03 0.589 
yr_2006 0.12 0.006 1.16 0.285 0.10 0.000 
yr_2007 0.12 0.002 0.29 0.696 0.07 0.001 
yr_2008 0.28 0.149 0.28 0.691 0.05 0.005 
yr_2009 0.15 0.135 0.04 0.952 0.03 0.007 
yr_2011 0.05 0.183 -1.56 0.216 0.01 0.267 
yr_2012 -0.02 0.192 3.17 0.105 0.00 0.786 
yr_2013 0.01 0.721 82.54 0.117 0.37 0.038 
yr_2014 0.00 0.966 -0.88 0.746 -0.04 0.164 
lg10beds 0.06 0.406 -5.27 0.269 -0.25 0.005 
gme 0.01 0.657 -11.20 0.310 0.06 0.050 
acute -0.29 0.123 30.74 0.055 0.31 0.013 
govfed 0.04 0.535 371.96 0.047 4.81 0.031 
govlocal 0.24 0.363 -20.88 0.282 -0.02 0.127 
govstate 0.03 0.509 -17.89 0.391 0.16 0.166 
proprietary 0.08 0.142 -24.61 0.327 0.04 0.031 
volnpchurch 0.02 0.677 -18.44 0.384 0.03 0.163 
volnpprivate -0.01 0.911 -21.73 0.327 0.02 0.033 
poppct_urban 0.00 0.164 -0.22 0.206 0.00 0.176 
_IacqXpoppc_1 0.00 0.576 0.20 0.159 0.00 0.299 
_cons 0.26 0.026 15.27 0.170 0.39 0.001 
 
 
The only variable that showed statistical significance in the percent change in 
inpatient charges was federal government ownership, at the p = .047 level, moving in a 
positive ( i.e., increasing) direction. Overall, the percent change in outpatient charges 
appeared to be increasing in the early years, with statistically significant increases in 
2006 (p < .001), 2007 (p = .001), 2008 (p = .005), and 2009 (p = .007), although the 
magnitude of increase appeared to be decreasing until 2011 and 2012. However, a 
statistically significant increase—at the p = .038 level—was observed again in 2013, 
followed by an insignificant change in 2014. 
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Bed size was associated with a decrease in the change in outpatient costs, as a 
statistically significant difference was seen at the p = .005 level. Conversely, teaching 
hospitals showed an increase in the percent change in outpatient charges at the p = .013 
level, while acute hospitals displayed a decrease (p = .031). In terms of hospital 
ownership, federal government (p = .031), proprietary (p = .031), and voluntary nonprofit 
privately owned (p = .033) hospitals showed statistically significant increases in the 
percent change in outpatient charges. 
III.5.2 Local acquisition.  
Local acquisition was accessed with and without the deal and acquirer type 
variables. Table 23 shows the consolidated regression results for the local acquisition 
variable described earlier (in section III.5 and Table 18). 
Acquirer experience showed a negative statistical significance (p = .007), which 
suggests that experienced acquirers do not tend to acquire hospitals within their own 
CSBA. This relationship appears to strengthen (p < .001) when the deal and the acquirer 
type variables are omitted.  
However, acquirer type might play a role in whether or not acquisitions are 
carried out within the same CSBA; since a statistically significant positive association (p 
= .001) is observed between hospital systems, or larger organizations, and acquisitions 
occurring in the same CSBA. 
All hospital ownership types studied—except for federal government and 
voluntary nonprofit private ownership—appear to be negatively associated with local 
acquisition: statistically significant negative differences were found for local government 
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(p = .010), state government (p < .001), proprietary (p = .005), and voluntary nonprofit 
church (p = .001) ownership types. 
 
When deal and acquirer types are omitted, acquirers with experience seem to be 
more negatively related to local acquisition (p < .001), and local acquisition appears to 
have been more prevalent in the early years as opposed to later years. Positive 
statistically significant differences were seen in 2006 (p < .001), 2007 (p = .006), 2008 (p 
= .035), and 2009 (p = .023), while negative statistically significant differences were seen 
in 2012 (p < .001) and 2013 (p < .001). However, 2014 returned to a statistically positive 
difference at p < .001. 
Table 23 Other Specifications—Local Acquisition 
Local acquisition consolidated results with and without deal and acquirer type 
  Locacq locacq 
Variable Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| 
acquired -5.00E-02 0.572 4.32E-02 0.670 
acqexp -1.48E-01 0.007 -1.94E-01 0.000 
typeofdeal 1.31E-02 0.839 ** ** 
acquirertype 1.92E-01 0.001 ** ** 
yr_2006 5.87E-03 0.000 5.58E-03 0.000 
yr_2007 1.27E-03 0.274 2.76E-03 0.006 
yr_2008 3.04E-03 0.002 2.02E-03 0.035 
yr_2009 2.70E-03 0.002 2.05E-03 0.023 
yr_2011 -1.45E-03 0.121 -1.46E-03 0.122 
yr_2012 -4.22E-03 0.000 -4.03E-03 0.000 
yr_2013 -1.02E-02 0.000 -1.08E-02 0.000 
yr_2014 4.85E-03 0.000 4.49E-03 0.000 
lg10beds 2.45E-03 0.485 2.23E-03 0.530 
gme 2.94E-03 0.574 3.60E-03 0.499 
acute 4.10E-03 0.154 4.31E-03 0.142 
govfed -9.16E-03 0.067 -9.23E-03 0.066 
govlocal -7.26E-03 0.008 -7.43E-03 0.010 
govstate -1.66E-02 0.000 -1.70E-02 0.000 
proprietary -1.33E-02 0.008 -1.44E-02 0.005 
volnpchurch -1.33E-02 0.001 -1.34E-02 0.001 
volnpprivate 8.46E-04 0.833 1.05E-03 0.797 
poppct_urban 1.33E-04 0.003 1.40E-04 0.002 
_IacqXpoppc_1 3.84E-03 0.003 4.41E-03 0.001 
_cons -4.95E-03 0.381 -4.68E-03 0.415 
**type of deal and acquirer type omitted 
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Local and state government, proprietary, and voluntary nonprofit church 
organizations appear to be associated negatively with local acquisition at statistically 
significant levels of p = .01, p < .001, p = .005, and p = .001, respectively. On the other 
hand, urbanization displayed a statistically significant positive association (p = .002). 
Full regression results for local acquisition and local acquisition without deal and 
acquirer types are shown in Table 24 andTable 25 below. 
Table 24 Local Acquisition Analysis 
Full regression results for local acquisition 
Linear Regression      
Number of obs     = 38,256      
F(23, 4533)       = 4.98      
Prob > F          = .000      
R-squared         = 0.1726      
Root MSE          = 0.10724      
  
(Std. Err. Adjusted for 4,534 clusters in bhid) 
Locacq Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Acquired -0.05 0.09 -0.57 0.572 -0.22 0.12 
Acqexp -0.15 0.05 -2.71 0.007 -0.26 -0.04 
Typeofdeal 0.01 0.06 0.20 0.839 -0.11 0.14 
Acquirertype 0.19 0.06 3.37 0.001 0.08 0.30 
_IacqXpoppc_1 0.00 0.00 2.97 0.003 0.00 0.01 
yr_2006 0.01 0.00 4.42 0.000 0.00 0.01 
yr_2007 0.00 0.00 1.09 0.274 0.00 0.00 
yr_2008 0.00 0.00 3.12 0.002 0.00 0.00 
yr_2009 0.00 0.00 3.03 0.002 0.00 0.00 
yr_2011 0.00 0.00 -1.55 0.121 0.00 0.00 
yr_2012 0.00 0.00 -4.15 0.000 -0.01 0.00 
yr_2013 -0.01 0.00 -5.40 0.000 -0.01 -0.01 
yr_2014 0.00 0.00 3.92 0.000 0.00 0.01 
lg10beds 0.00 0.00 0.70 0.485 0.00 0.01 
Gme 0.00 0.01 0.56 0.574 -0.01 0.01 
Acute 0.00 0.00 1.43 0.154 0.00 0.01 
Govfed -0.01 0.01 -1.83 0.067 -0.02 0.00 
Govlocal -0.01 0.00 -2.66 0.008 -0.01 0.00 
Govstate -0.02 0.00 -4.88 0.000 -0.02 -0.01 
Proprietary -0.01 0.00 -2.67 0.008 -0.02 0.00 
Volnpchurch -0.01 0.00 -3.34 0.001 -0.02 -0.01 
Volnpprivate 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.833 -0.01 0.01 
poppct_urban 0.00 0.00 2.94 0.003 0.00 0.00 





Table 25 Local Acquisition Analysis—Modified 
Local acquisition without deal and acquirer type variables 
Linear Regression      
Number of obs = 38,256      
F(21, 4533) = 4.87      
Prob > F = 0.000      
R-squared = 0.1563      
Root MSE = 0.10829      
  (Std. Err. Adjusted for4,534 clusters in bhid) 
Locacq Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Acquired 0.0432457 0.101348 0.43 0.670 -0.15544 0.241936 
Acqexp -0.1937935 0.052942 -3.66 0.000 -0.29759 -0.09 
_IacqXpoppc_1 0.0044066 0.001305 3.38 0.001 0.001848 0.006965 
yr_2006 0.0055835 0.001311 4.26 0.000 0.003013 0.008155 
yr_2007 0.0027617 0.001004 2.75 0.006 0.000793 0.004731 
yr_2008 0.0020211 0.000959 2.11 0.035 0.000141 0.003902 
yr_2009 0.0020543 0.000901 2.28 0.023 0.000289 0.00382 
yr_2011 -0.0014646 0.000948 -1.55 0.122 -0.00332 0.000393 
yr_2012 -0.0040315 0.00099 -4.07 0.000 -0.00597 -0.00209 
yr_2013 -0.010755 0.001913 -5.62 0.000 -0.0145 -0.00701 
yr_2014 0.0044856 0.001261 3.56 0.000 0.002014 0.006957 
lg10beds 0.0022264 0.003546 0.63 0.530 -0.00473 0.009178 
Gme 0.003596 0.00532 0.68 0.499 -0.00683 0.014025 
Acute 0.0043114 0.002937 1.47 0.142 -0.00145 0.010069 
Govfed -0.009232 0.005013 -1.84 0.066 -0.01906 0.000595 
Govlocal -0.0074324 0.002865 -2.59 0.010 -0.01305 -0.00182 
Govstate -0.0169949 0.003468 -4.9 0.000 -0.02379 -0.0102 
Proprietary -0.0143967 0.005155 -2.79 0.005 -0.0245 -0.00429 
Volnpchurch -0.0134494 0.00407 -3.3 0.001 -0.02143 -0.00547 
Volnpprivate 0.0010489 0.004068 0.26 0.797 -0.00693 0.009024 
poppct_urban 0.0001396 4.54E-05 3.07 0.002 5.06E-05 0.000229 






This study’s contributions are an early analysis of empirical evidence—in the 
form of current data recognized for measuring hospital performance—that targets M&A 
activity in the healthcare industry and provides insight into that activity’s relationship to 
the goals of improving healthcare quality and decreasing its cost. These goals are now 
key ACA initiatives. Despite that, there is a paucity of current literature that takes a 
comprehensive look at this topic across the United States. Rather, the body of literature 
focuses on a single state or a region. As an exception, Spang et al. (2009) performed a 
comprehensive study using 1988–1997 data from the American Hospital Association 
(AHA) as a primary source, along with Medicare cost data, to focus on urban, horizontal 
hospital consolidation to explicate the relationship between consolidation and cost and 
price outcomes. Because the data preceded the beginning of standardized, nationally 
reported quality measures, it would not have been possible to include quality metrics, and 
thus their study could not shed light in this area. 
Additionally, this study extends organizational learning theory to the healthcare 
industry as it relates to horizontal M&As. In its basic form, organizational learning theory 
suggests that repeating a task improves performance on that task. However, it appears to 
be important that the repeated task is fundamentally the same. Focus-increasing strategies 
have been shown to require different skills than focus-decreasing strategies (Daniliuc et 
al., 2014; Salter & Weinhold, 1981; Shrivastava, 1986; Vestring et al., 2004), so 
successful acquisition experience in one type of strategy may not translate into a roadmap 
for future successful acquisitions. One of this study’s goals was to examine the 
relationship between horizontal M&A experience and the target variables—that is, does a 
healthcare organization learn from prior experience in the M&A arena? Is that learning 
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observable in study results? My results here support the notion that a hospital 
organization can “learn,” at least in terms of its ability to decrease operating and capital 
cost-to-charge ratios. This contributes new information to the discussion on M&A 
activity in the healthcare industry. 
Table 26 provides a simplified depiction of the regression results in terms of the 
statistically significant associations observed for the dependent variables and the 
independent variables of interest. 
 Table 26 Summary of Regression Results 







Heart Attack NS NS  – NS 0.3928 
Heart Failure NS  + NS NS 0.2985 
Pneumonia NS NS  + NS 0.2109 
Surgical Infection Prevention  – NS NS  + 0.1994 
      








Operating Cost-to-Charge Ratio  –  – NS NS 0.2955 
Capital Cost-to-Charge Ratio NS – NS NS 0.1436 
 
 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 were not consistently supported by the study data. This 
implies that the apparent hospital acquisition trend may not be improving adherence to 
the quality of care protocols. It also begs the question: Are the consolidation efforts, 
which are contributing to M&A activity, helpful or ineffective? If ineffective, as this 
research on quality data implies, then practitioners going into an M&A should perhaps 
expect economies of scale, as there does appear to be an association between costs and 
acquisition, with acquisition lowering costs. Practitioners might also want to add a 
consultant experienced in the same type of acquisition to their acquisition team. This is 
especially true if their organization has no experience in M&As; this research suggests 
 55 
that acquisition experience is associated with lowered operating and capital costs for the 
acquired facility. From a regulatory standpoint, if horizontal M&As do not harm quality 
scores, then an antitrust position toward this type of acquisition might be softened. 
One exception to the lack of hypotheses support is found in my estimation of the 
relationship between hospital compliance with heart failure measures and M&A activity: 
acquisition experience, at least for this measure, might be associated with improved 
scores and thus supports Hypothesis 2. The nature of this measure must be accounted for 
here, because other unmeasured variables could be at play. The measure scores the 
number of heart failure patients that have been given discharge instructions. An example 
of an unexamined variable that might impact this score is the level of information 
technology (IT) capabilities that exist before and after acquisition in hospitals whose 
acquirers have had at least one prior acquisition experience. In such cases, experienced 
acquirers with a minimum, or higher level, of IT capability might understand that 
discharge instructions can be automated to print at patient discharge and thus be part of 
the discharge procedure and included with other discharge documents. To fully explore 
this possibility, it would be necessary to have IT data for each year, or at least for a 
reasonable number of the years studied. An acceptable proxy might be Electronic 
Medical Record (EMR) adoption rates, which is now being implemented at various rates 
across the healthcare industry. Unfortunately, this measure was not available for all years 
of the study. Healthcare Information System (HCIS) data is available publicly and at no 
charge for three years (2009–2011) at www.cms.gov. The industry has been moving 
toward adoption of EMR legislation (Dranove, Garthwaite, Li, & Ody, 2015),—the 
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH)—was 
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passed in 2009 to provide financial subsidies to spur the industry on and, at that point, 
tracking mechanisms were put in place. Some evidence shows that EMR adoption 
positively impacts patient outcomes (Goodwin, Jinhyung, & Yong-Fang, 2013), though 
the authors suggest that the substantial financial investment for federal subsidies directed 
at the project sped up adoption by only two years. Evidence also exists that, in the 
outpatient care sector, EMR can positively impact both quality of care and efficiency 
(Xiao et al., 2012), depending on the length of use. The Xiao et al. (2012) study used 
cross-sectional data from a survey instrument in the physician’s office sector. Other 
researchers conducted a two-year pre/post study on the effects of hospital consolidation 
on inpatient quality of care using all-payer administrative data and quality metrics from 
the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) (Mutter et al., 2011). Of the 25 
quality measures studied, none were TEC measures. For hospitals of any type (acquiring 
or acquired), the researchers found quality improvement for two measures and reduced 
quality for two other measures (Mutter et al., 2011, p. 119, Table 3). Acquired or “target” 
hospitals showed an improved quality in one measure and reduced quality in four 
measures (Mutter et al., 2011, p. 121, Table 5). This prompted the authors to report that 
“hospital consolidations appear to have complex, inconsistent effects on quality.” 
A possible avenue of further research on IT’s impact on more action-oriented 
quality measures could investigate the use of automatic pharmacy dispensation based on 
the presenting disease state or procedure to be performed. As an example, the surgical 
infection prevention measure indicates that antibiotics should be given one hour before 
surgical incision, so antibiotics could be set to automatically dispense with other pre-
surgical items. 
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The data supported Hypotheses 3 and 4 in that the operating cost-to-charge ratio 
was lower, compared to non-acquired hospitals, for both acquired hospitals and hospitals 
whose acquirers had prior acquisition experience. The capital cost-to-charge ratio 
variable delivered mixed results. Acquisition was not associated with a statistically 
significant difference in this variable, which does not support Hypothesis 5. However, 
acquisition experience is associated with a lower ratio in a statistically significant 
manner, which supports Hypothesis 6.  
If economies of scale are the desired outcome, care must be taken to monitor 
M&As so that the hospital cost of care does not decrease while charges to the consumer 
remain the same or increase. Large regional acquisitions can also raise issues, as they can 
capture a large market area and reduce competition, thus creating antitrust issues. 
The results observed for operating and capital cost-to-charge ratios prompted an 
investigation of possible underlying contributors to the observed results. An examination 
of the percent change in inpatient and outpatient charges and hospital costs revealed few 
statistically significant differences in costs or inpatient charges year-over-year. However, 
the percent changes in outpatient charges year-over-year showed differences in a positive 
direction, but this change appeared to be decreasing over time. Results of this 
specification suggest that the observed decrease in the cost-to-charge ratios observed in 
association with consolidation might be attributable either to increases in outpatient 
charges that are outstripping the increases in costs. Or, it might be that the costs and 
inpatient charges are remaining flat and outpatient charges are still increasing at a 
statistically significant rate, while decreasing from a percent change perspective. 
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The latter case appears to be supported by the percent change regressions seen in 
Table 19–Table 21 in section III.5.1. To this point, Figure 4 shows the raw data across all 
hospitals studied that report to CMS, and seems to indicate that all three parameters—
costs, and inpatient and outpatient charges—are increasing. 
 
As a point of reference, a visual inspection of US inflation (US Inflation 
Calculator, 2016) and population growth estimate (Amercian Community Survey, 2005-







2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Costs and Inpatient/Outpatient Charges 
Costs Inpatient Charges Outpatient Charges
Figure 4 Hospital Costs and Charges 
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Figure 5 Inflation and Population Gtowth 
Growth rates from 2006 to 2014 
Of course, if technology and the bundle of services change over time, the increase 
in charges may be driven by the change in the bundle of services. 
When the costs and charges are plotted as a percent change—that is, each 
previous year is used as a base for the next year’s percent growth, as seen in Figure 6 
below—a complementary story emerges that implies that the percent change might be 
decreasing for all three. Although this is not a significant change in the case of costs and 
inpatient charges, for outpatient charges there is a statistically significant difference year-
over-year and, while still positive, the value of the coefficients is becoming smaller (see 
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Figure 6 Hospital Percent Change in Costs and Charges Year-over-Year 
Costs and Inpatient/Outpatient Charges—Percent Change 
The operating cost results found in this study disagree with those found by 
Azevedo and Mateus (2014, p. 1007) in their study of hospitals in Portugal. When it came 
to “total variable cost,” their research found no significant difference between hospitals 
that had been merged and those that had not. However, their model did not include a 
variable for quality. Azevedo and Mateus argued that, while the literature recommends 
including a quality variable to avoid omission bias, some studies indicated that quality 
measures were not significant in hospital cost functions; their references here were to 
work by Carey (2003) and Zuckerman, Hadley, and Iezzoni (1994). Given that they 
lacked sufficient degrees of freedom,—i.e., their sample size was too small—the authors 
decided to exclude a quality variable. 
In any study, cost must be clearly defined, as “cost” can mean many things, 
depending on the beholder (or the stakeholder). To the uninsured or direct-pay consumer, 
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Cost % Change Inpatient % Change Outpatient % Change
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hospital fees for services rendered. Insurance carriers negotiate prices and pay on the 
consumer’s behalf; poor negotiations reflect in a consumer’s copay, which is a 
percentage of what is charged to their insurance carriers. The terms “cost” and “prices” 
are sometimes used interchangeably. In this study, hospital costs refer to the amount that 
a hospital spends to deliver its services. Charges are what hospitals bill the insurance 
carriers or the patients who pay for medical care directly out of pocket. These definitions 
are in line with the “cost” and “prices” studied in Spang et al. (2009). The results 
observed in this study also align with work by Spang et al. (2009), in that they observed 
negative cost and price coefficients post-merger, in contrast to the positive coefficients 
observed pre-merger. The current study may present a finer point on the topic in that it 
evaluates inpatient and outpatient charges separately and uses cost-to-charge ratios rather 
than the “natural log of total hospital expenses (in and outpatient) per inpatient adjusted 
day.” In the Spang et al. (2009) model, outpatient visits were converted into inpatient 
days “…based on relative revenue generated by each.” 
The focus on establishing an ACO structure—a focus-decreasing strategy, given 
that these are vertical acquisitions—is also contributing to M&A activity in the industry. 
My results for both quality and efficiency do not address the possible associations 
between ACO structure and M&As. It remains to be explored whether the ACO focus is 
effective in improving quality or cost. 
Hospital consolidations, or horizontal mergers, and the move toward ACO 
structure are efforts to gain control of as many patient lives as possible to decrease 
variations in the cost of care and mitigate the risk associated with the new payment 
system that the ACA is establishing. 
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In terms of targets to pursue, as Table 27 indicates, larger hospitals (log10 beds) 
seem to be associated with higher quality scores; the current study also suggests that 
these hospitals might be unaffected by acquisition and have lower operating and capital 
cost-to-charge ratios. However, evidence also suggests that the benefit of hospital bed 
size associated with economies of scale is maximized at approximately 230 beds 
(Azevedo & Mateus, 2014, p. 1008).  
Table 27 Statistically Significant Control Associations 
Positive and negative associations  















yr_2006 – – – –  +  + 
yr_2007 – – – –  +  + 
yr_2008 – – – –  +  + 
yr_2009 – – – – NS* NS 
yr_2011 + + + + NS NS 
yr_2012 + + + +  –  – 
yr_2013 + + + +  –  – 
yr_2014 + + + N/A  –  – 
lg10beds + + + –  –  – 
gme 
(teaching) NS – – NS  + NS 
acute + NS NS – collinearity collinearity 
govfed NS – NS –  –  – 
govlocal NS NS NS NS  +  + 
govstate – – – NS  + NS 
proprietary NS NS NS NS  –  – 
volnpchurch NS + + +  –  – 
volnpprivate NS + + + NS NS 
poppct_urban NS NS + +  –  – 
 
* NS = Not statistically significant 
Azevedo and Mateus (2014, p. 1008) also found that, with respect to the cost 
effects of hospital mergers in Portugal, “…..economies of scale are exhausted when a 
hospital reaches a size of about 230 beds.” In fact, the authors suggest that acquiring 
hospitals larger than 230 beds results in diseconomies of scale. This could be an avenue 
of future research using the US hospital data studied here. The regression results 
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presented in sections III.3 and III.4 suggest that bed size might consistently influence 
both quality and cost-to-charge ratios. It would be interesting to determine which 
characteristics of hospitals vary with bed size. 
An additional specification, local acquisition, was investigated to see if it might 
reflect a desire to capture market share to control pricing. Although local acquisition did 
not appear to have a statistically significant association with the dependent variables 
when used as a control in the initial model, when local acquisition was examined as a 
dependent variable, it appears to be negatively associated with acquirer experience. This 
might be a function of acquiring locally first and then branching out. A more detailed 
investigation of this possibility is warranted for future research. 
IV.1 Limitations 
IV.1.1 Medicare data.  
The number of Medicare quality data measures studied was limited because many 
TEC measures were inconsistently categorized or defined. I limited my study to four 
measures, with one (surgical infection prevention) falling out of the data in 2014. In 
addition, it’s possible that the four quality measures studied have been the most 
problematic; a subjective observation of the surgical infection prevention data indicates 
that measure scores might drop off as the reported results approach 100 percent over 
time. This is a double-edged sword, as it means that the measures studied might be the 
most recalcitrant to change. Additionally, hospitals may have had the option to report on 
either of the two heart attack measures, one of which (heart attack measure AMI_8a) 
endured, while the other (heart attack measure HAM7, later renamed AMI_7a) dropped 
off consistently until only one hospital reported it in 2014. 
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Another issue, in terms of consistency, is that the measure protocols and 
guidelines often changed over time. For example, during the study period, the heart attack 
PCI protocol, which dictates that a heart attack patient should receive PCI treatment 
within a certain time limit, went from 120 to 90 minutes; and, in 2009, the pneumonia 
measure’s PNM14 protocol, patients given the most appropriate initial antibiotic, was 
changed to “initial antibiotic selection for community acquired pneumonia (CAP) 
immunocompetent patient” when the measure was changed from PNM14 to PN_6. 
The focus on quality metrics, both before and after the ACA, limits how much can 
be attributed to the ACA compared to, say, value-based purchasing or the healthcare 
industry’s own focus on this topic. Focus alone could prompt change regardless of 
impending or subsequent ACA penalties, which might be brought to bear as in the well-
studied “Hawthorne Effect” (Mayo, 1933; Roethlisberger, Dickson, & Wright, 1939).  
Finally, the TEC measures are only one category of quality measures; results from 
other quality measure categories might produce different results. This is an additional 
area for future research. 
IV.1.2 Hospital characteristics.  
Acquired hospitals may be acquired because they are poor performers. Thus, one 
avenue of future research might be an investigation of financial data prior to acquisition. 
Such a pursuit was beyond the scope of this study. 
Data on the percent of the population urbanized was from one year, 2010; it is 
possible that the demographics shifted within the five-year period(s) before and/or after 
enactment of the ACA. 
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Market conditions and the economy, in any given year, can impact the course of 
acquisition events and cause large buyouts, such as the Triad acquisition (19 May 2007). 
These events can skew the data or decrease M&A activity, as observed after the 2008 
crisis (see section III.2 Bloomberg Data). 
For M&As, I used the Bloomberg announcement date as the acquisition date. 
Many acquisitions take a long time to complete; timing can be impacted by both the 
integration timeline and the degree of integration (Shrivastava, 1986; Vestring et al., 
2004; Viegas-Pires, 2013). The study design attempted to compensate for the 
announcement date versus acquisition date lag by using the 2005 acquisition data to code 
hospital observations in 2006 as either acquired or not, and eliminating the 2014 
acquisition data; thus the actual “acquired” hospitals in the study ran from 2006 to 2013. 
IV.1.3 Capital Cost-to-Charge Ratio.  
In this study, the capital cost-to-charge ratio I examined was that of the acquired 
hospital. The results might be different if studied in the acquiring hospital, as capital costs 
for shared services might not be passed down to the acquired hospital from an accounting 
standpoint. As an example, the IT investment to bring the acquired onboard with the 
acquiring entity’s IT infrastructure or to upgrade the acquired facility’s capabilities might 
be accrued to the acquiring facility. In fact, evidence supports this idea and the results of 
this study; many researchers have found that the acquirer suffers financially (Chatterjee, 
1992; Datta et al., 1992; King et al., 2004; Moeller et al., 2003; Seth et al., 2002) while 
the acquired experiences improved performance (Asquith & Kim, 1982; Datta et al., 




The results here represent an early look at hospital quality measures and their 
possible relationship to the ACA. For some, 10 years may not seem like a brief period of 
time, but the timeframe should be put in perspective. After all, healthcare reform has 
been ongoing for many years ("Health Care Reform Chronology," 2016). 
The primary focus of this research centered on the healthcare initiatives of 
improving quality and decreasing costs. The M&A activity trend, noted by other authors 
and seen in this study’s results, does not appear to be consistently associated with better 
quality measure scores related to the measures studied. Acquisition does appear to be 
associated with the efficiency side, as supported by the results observed for the operating 
cost-to-charge ratio. For practical purposes, this suggests that the decision to endure the 
expense of acquisition should be based on financial goals, recognizing that improved 
quality scores may not be realized. Other metrics should be chosen to factor more heavily 
in the business decision. Further, a mechanism other than M&A activity should be sought 
to improve quality measure scores, at least for the four measures studied here, which 
seem to be problematic and enduring. As I discussed in the introduction, Barkema and 
Schijven (2008) suggested that repeated M&A experience improves efficiency, but 
perhaps not effectiveness, in the healthcare industry. The results of this study support this 
idea, assuming that, in healthcare, effectiveness is sought through improved quality 
measure scores. 
It must be remembered that the results of this study demonstrated a statistically 
significant difference between acquired and unacquired hospitals with regard to the 
operating cost-to-charge ratio (see section III.3.5. and section III.4,Table 17 Consolidated 
Results Table). Yet, the same specification, when applied to percent change (see section 
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III.5.1 and Table 22), did not show a statistically significant difference, though the 
coefficients ran in the same negative direction, with a larger inpatient than outpatient 
charge coefficient for the acquired. It might be reasonable to consider the notion that, 
while acquired hospitals do have better operating cost-to-charge ratios than unacquired 
hospitals, the unacquired hospitals may be experiencing decreasing cost-to-charge ratios 
as well. (Note that the CMS reported operating and capital cost-to-charge ratios are 
adjusted here, as per the Medicare Claims Processing Manual [Government, 2003]). 
Although it is tempting to attempt conclusions related to the ACA legislation’s 
effects, the fact that quality metrics existed before the ACA suggests that quality 
improvement was underway well before the ACA. There is also a troublesome 
confounding factor: profound legislative changes were anticipated well before the 
legislation was enacted, which may have prompted changes well before institution of the 
law. This is particularly true with respect to innovative hospital and/or health systems, 
such as Geisinger (Paulus, Davis, & Steele, 2008; Robeznieks, 2015), so it is difficult to 
parse out the effects of the legislation itself. Notwithstanding these complications, 
statistically significant year-over-year improvement in the quality measure scores studied 
in this research indicates a steady cadence of improvement both before and after the 
ACA. 
Hospital financial perspectives are also more complex when trying to determine 
which factors effect cost, as numerous factors are influential. Indeed, the number of 
factors studied are too numerous to cite here. Still, the fact remains that the percent 
changes in costs and inpatient charges remained statistically the same over time, while 
the percent change in outpatient charges increased over time—albeit, at a decreasing 
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rate—year-over-year, as discussed in Chapter IV (and depicted in Figure 6 Hospital 
Percent Change in Costs and Charges . Thus, a change in the cost-to-charge ratio in a 
negative direction might be a step in the right direction, though it may reflect only an 
increase in inpatient and/or outpatient charges, and not a decrease in cost.  
In this study, the rise in outpatient charges may have contributed to or been 
responsible for the decreases observed in operating cost-to-charge ratios for acquired 
hospitals and hospitals whose acquirers had experience, as well as the decreased capital 
cost-to-charge ratio observed in hospitals whose acquirers had experience. 
From an academic standpoint and in terms of organizational learning theory, 
M&A experience may lead to improved financial measures, but not to improved quality 
measure scores. The exception here is the heart failure measure. As I discussed earlier, 
this exception may be due to the nature of the measure and to IT’s potential to improve it. 
When extending organizational learning theory to M&A activity in the healthcare 
industry, it appears that the financial metrics may be more influenced than the quality 
aspect; again, this would support Barkema and Schijven (2008). From a practical 
standpoint, if an acquirer with experience is pursuing hospital consolidation, this 
experience seems to be associated with lower hospital costs. However, results from the 
literature suggest that practitioners with experience should be mindful of the association 
between integration activity intensity and performance that falls below expectations when 
pursuing an ACO structure through M&As.  
Organizational learning theory seems to apply best to the healthcare industry in 
relation to the efficiency measures studied. However, it is crucial to ensure that the 
prospective task to be repeated has been studied and found to be the same task previously 
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experienced. Further, focus-increasing strategies seem to require different skills than 
focus-decreasing strategies. In the current environment, many healthcare organization are 
participating in both. Finally, identifying the correct actions to achieve the best results is 
the key to realizing expectations.  
The implication that acquisition does not harm quality and might decrease costs 
would be good news for the consumers of and payers for healthcare services, as long as 
some of the savings are passed down. It also might also provide some relief for regulatory 
bodies concerned with antitrust issues, in that M&A activity does not seem to negatively 
impact consumer welfare. 
Additional areas for future research include understanding more fully which 
characteristics of strategy, structure, process, and other variables that acquirers put in 
place lead to a decrease in the operating cost-to-charge ratio. Also, regarding the capital 
cost-to-charge ratio, what do experienced acquirers do that leads to a decrease in this 
ratio, and what are the strategies behind those actions? Further, certain ownership types—
in particular, federal government and proprietary-owned hospitals—were observed to be 
associated with statistically significant positive coefficients in year-over-year changes in 
outpatient charges, while voluntary nonprofit private ownerships appear to have a 
negative association. Acute care hospitals have a negative coefficient here, reflecting 
lower outpatient charges, while a positive association was found for teaching hospitals. 
What variables are driving these differences? Pursuing these avenues of research might 





Appendix A Data Demographics and Data Sets 





















Income Statement Net Patient Revenue 
Income Statement Patient Revenue 
Income Statement Operating Expenses 
Income Statement Net Margin 
Income Statement Net Income 
Directory Code 



















Provider ID Provider ID Provider ID Provider ID 
Hospital Name Hospital Name Hospital Name Hospital Name 
Address Address Address Address 
City City City City 
State State State State 
ZIP Code ZIP Code ZIP Code ZIP Code 
County Name County Name County Name County Name 
Phone Number Phone Number Phone Number Phone Number 
Hospital Type Measure Name HCAHPS Measure ID Measure Name 
Hospital Ownership Measure ID HCAHPS Question Measure ID 
Emergency 
Services 
Measure Response HCAHPS Answer 
Description 
Compared to National 
 Footnote HCAHPS Answer Percent Score 
 Measure Start Date Number of Completed 
Surveys 
Footnote 
 Measure End Date Survey Response Rate 
Percent 
Measure Start Date 
  Footnote Measure End Date 
  Measure Start Date Year 
  Measure End Date  
 
Medicare Data Set—







Provider ID Provider ID Hospital Name 
Hospital Name Hospital Name Provider Number 
Address Address State 
City City Measure Name 
State State Number of Discharges 
ZIP Code ZIP Code Footnote 
County Name County Name Excess Readmission Ratio 
Phone Number Phone Number Predicted Readmission Rate 
Condition Measure Name Expected Readmission Rate 
Measure ID Measure ID Number of Readmissions 
Measure Name Compared to National Start Date 
Score Denominator End Date 
Sample Score   
Footnote Lower Estimate   
Measure Start Date Higher Estimate   
Measure End Date Footnote   
  Measure Start Date   
  Measure End Date   
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Appendix A.3—Medicare Acronyms 
Acronym Meaning 
AMI Acute Myocardial Infarction 
Avg Average 
CAC Children's Asthma Care 
COMP-HP-KNEE Total Hip/Knee Arthoroplasty 30-Day Complication Rate 
ED Emergency Department 
FTNT Footnote 
HACRP Hospital-Acquired Conditions Reduction Program 
HAI Healthcare Associated Infections 
HBIPS Hospital-Based Inpatient Psychiatric Services 
HCAHPS Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems 
HF Heart Failure 
HIT Health Information Technology 
HRRP Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program 
HVBP Hospital Value-Based Purchasing 
IMG Imaging 
IMM Immunization 
IPFQR Inpatient Psychiatric Facility Quality Reporting 
IQR Inpatient Quality Reporting 
MORT Mortality 
MSPB 
Medicare Spending Per Beneficiary (also known as SPP for Spending Per 
Patient) 
MSR Measure 
MPV Medicare Payments and Volume 
MV Medicare Volume 
NQF National Quality Forum 
OIE Outpatient Imaging Efficiency 
OP Outpatient 
OQR Outpatient Quality Reporting 
PCHQR PPS-Exempt Cancer Hospital Quality Reporting 
PN Pneumonia 
PSI Patient Safety Indicators 
READM Readmissions 
SCIP Surgical Care Improvement Project 
SM Structural Measures 
STK Stroke 
TPS Total Performance Score 




Appendix A.4—Medicare Data Set Components 
Medicare Data Set—Structural Measures 
Measure ID Measure Name 
OP_12 Able to Receive Lab Results Electronically 
OP_17 
Able to Track Patients’ Lab Results, Tests, and Referrals Electronically 
Between Visits 
OP_25 Safe Surgery Checklist Use 
SM_PART_CARD Cardiac Surgery Registry 
SM_PART_GEN_SU
RG General Surgery Registry 
SM_PART_NURSE Nursing Care Registry 
SM_PART_STROKE Stroke Care Registry 
ACS_REGISTRY Multispecialty Surgical Registry 
 
Medicare Data Set HCAHPS—Patient Satisfaction Survey 
HCAHPS  
Measure ID 




Patients who reported that their room and 
bathroom were "Always" clean 
Room was "always" clean 
H_CLEAN_HSP_S
N_P 
Patients who reported that their room and 
bathroom were "Sometimes" or "Never" 
clean 




Patients who reported that their room and 
bathroom were "Usually" clean 
Room was "usually" clean 
H_COMP_1_A_P Patients who reported that their nurses 
"Always" communicated well 
Nurses "always" 
communicated well 
H_COMP_1_SN_P Patients who reported that their nurses 
"Sometimes" or "Never" communicated well 
Nurses "sometimes" or "never" 
communicated well 
H_COMP_1_U_P Patients who reported that their nurses 
"Usually" communicated well 
Nurses "usually" 
communicated well 
H_COMP_2_A_P Patients who reported that their doctors 
"Always" communicated well 
Doctors "always" 
communicated well 
H_COMP_2_SN_P Patients who reported that their doctors 
"Sometimes" or "Never" communicated well 
Doctors "sometimes" or 
"never" communicated well 
H_COMP_2_U_P Patients who reported that their doctors 
"Usually" communicated well 
Doctors "usually" 
communicated well 
H_COMP_3_A_P Patients who reported that they "Always" 
received help as soon as they wanted 
Patients "always" received 
help as soon as they wanted 
H_COMP_3_SN_P Patients who reported that they "Sometimes" 
or "Never" received help as soon as they 
wanted 
Patients "sometimes" or 
"never" received help as soon 
as they wanted 
H_COMP_3_U_P Patients who reported that they "Usually" 
received help as soon as they wanted 
Patients "usually" received 
help as soon as they wanted 
H_COMP_4_A_P Patients who reported that their pain was 
"Always" well controlled 
Pain was "always" well 
controlled 
H_COMP_4_SN_P Patients who reported that their pain was 
"Sometimes" or "Never" well controlled 
Pain was "sometimes" or 
"never" well controlled 
H_COMP_4_U_P Patients who reported that their pain was 
"Usually" well controlled 
Pain was "usually" well 
controlled 
H_COMP_5_A_P Patients who reported that staff "Always" 
explained about medicines before giving it to 
them 
Staff "always" explained 
Table Continued Next Page 
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Medicare Data Set—HCAHPS Patient Satisfaction Survey (cont.) 
HCAHPS Measure 
ID 
HCAHPS Question HCAHPS Answer 
Description 
H_COMP_5_SN_P Patients who reported that staff "Sometimes" 
or "Never" explained about medicines before 
giving it to them 
Staff "sometimes" or "never" 
explained 
H_COMP_5_U_P Patients who reported that staff "Usually" 
explained about medicines before giving it to 
them 
Staff "usually" explained 
H_COMP_4_U_P Patients who reported that their pain was 
"Usually" well controlled 
Pain was "usually" well 
controlled 
H_COMP_7_SA Patients who "Strongly Agree" they 
understood their care when they left the 
hospital 
Patients who “Strongly Agree” 
they understood their care 
when they left the hospital 
H_HSP_RATING_0
_6 
Patients who gave their hospital a rating of 6 
or lower on a scale from 0 (lowest) to 10 
(highest) 
Patients who gave a rating of 
"6" or lower (low) 
H_HSP_RATING_7
_8 
Patients who gave their hospital a rating of 7 
or 8 on a scale from 0 (lowest) to 10 
(highest) 
Patients who gave a rating of 
"7" or "8" (medium) 
H_HSP_RATING_9
_10 
Patients who gave their hospital a rating of 9 
or 10 on a scale from 0 (lowest) to 10 
(highest) 
Patients who gave a rating of 
"9" or "10" (high) 
H_QUIET_HSP_A_
P 
Patients who reported that the area around 
their room was "Always" quiet at night 
"Always" quiet at night 
H_QUIET_HSP_SN
_P 
Patients who reported that the area around 
their room was "Sometimes" or "Never" 
quiet at night 




Patients who reported that the area around 
their room was "Usually" quiet at night 
"Usually" quiet at night 
H_RECMND_DN Patients who reported NO, they would 
probably not or definitely not recommend 
the hospital 
"NO", patients would not 
recommend the hospital (they 
probably would not or 
definitely would not 
recommend it) 
H_RECMND_DY Patients who reported YES, they would 
definitely recommend the hospital 
"YES", patients would 
definitely recommend the 
hospital 
H_RECMND_PY Patients who reported YES, they would 
probably recommend the hospital 
"YES", patients would 





Medicare Data Set—Readmissions, Complications, and Deaths 
Measure ID Measure Name 
COMP_HIP_KNEE Rate of complications for hip/knee replacement patients 
MORT_30_AMI Acute myocardial infarction (AMI) 30-day mortality rate 
MORT_30_COPD 
Death rate for chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) 
patients 
MORT_30_HF Heart failure (HF) 30-day mortality rate 
MORT_30_PN Pneumonia (PN) 30-day mortality rate 
MORT_30_STK Death rate for stroke patients 
PSI_12_POSTOP_PULMEMB_DVT Serious blood clots after surgery 
PSI_14_POSTOP_DEHIS 
A wound that splits open after surgery on the abdomen or 
pelvis 
PSI_15_ACC_LAC Accidental cuts and tears from medical treatment 
PSI_4_SURG_COMP 
Deaths among patients with serious treatable complications 
after surgery 
PSI_6_IAT_PTX Collapsed lung due to medical treatment 
PSI_90_SAFETY Serious complications 
READM_30_AMI Acute myocardial infarction (AMI) 30-day readmission rate 
READM_30_COPD 
Rate of unplanned readmission for chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease (COPD) patients 
READM_30_HF Heart failure (HF) 30-day readmission rate 
READM_30_HIP_KNEE Rate of readmission after hip/knee surgery 
READM_30_HOSP_WIDE 
Rate of readmission after discharge from hospital (hospital-
wide) 
READM_30_PN Pneumonia (PN) 30-day readmission rate 
READM_30_STK Rate of unplanned readmission for stroke patients 
 
 
Medicare Data Set—Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP) 
Measure Name Description 
READM-30-AMI-HRRP 
Readmission, for any cause, within 30 days of index hospitalization for 
AMI 
READM-30-COPD-HRRP 
Readmission, for any cause, within 30 days of index hospitalization for 
COPD 
READM-30-HF-HRRP 




Readmission, for any cause, within 30 days of index hospitalization for 
hip or knee replacement 
READM-30-PN-HRRP 
Readmission, for any cause, within 30 days of index hospitalization for 
Pneumonia 
 
Medicare Data Set—Outpatient Imaging Efficiency 
Measure ID Measure Name 
OP_10 Abdomen CT use of contrast material 
OP_11 Thorax CT use of contrast material 
OP_13 Outpatients who got cardiac imaging stress tests before low-risk outpatient surgery 
OP_14 Outpatients with brain CT scans who got a sinus CT scan at the same time 
OP_8 MRI lumbar spine for low back pain 





Medicare Data Set—Medicare Volume 
Diagnosis Related Group 
Extracranial procedures w/ CC 
Extracranial procedures w/o CC/MCC 
Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease w/ MCC 
Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease w/ CC 
Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease w/o CC/MCC 
Simple pneumonia and pleurisy w/ MCC 
Cardiac valve and oth maj cardiothoracic proc w/o card cath w/ MCC 
Cardiac valve and oth maj cardiothoracic proc w/o card cath w/ CC 
Cardiac valve and oth maj cardiothoracic proc w/o card cath w/o CC/MCC 
Cardiac defib implant w cardiac cath w/o AMI/HF/shock w/ MCC 
Cardiac defib implant w cardiac cath w/o AMI/HF/shock w/o MCC 
Cardiac defibrillator implant w/o cardiac cath w/ MCC 
Cardiac defibrillator implant w/o cardiac cath w/o MCC 
Coronary bypass w/o cardiac cath w/ MCC 
Coronary bypass w/o cardiac cath w/o MCC 
Major cardiovasc procedures w/ MCC or thoracic aortic aneurysm repair 
Permanent cardiac pacemaker implant w/ CC 
Permanent cardiac pacemaker implant w/o CC/MCC 
Perc cardiovasc proc w drug-eluting stent w/o MCC 
Acute myocardial infarction, discharged alive w/ MCC 
Acute myocardial infarction, discharged alive w/ CC 
Acute myocardial infarction, discharged alive w/o CC/MCC 
Heart failure and shock w/ MCC 
Heart failure and shock w/ CC 
Heart failure and shock w/o CC/MCC 
Chest pain 
Stomach, esophageal duodenal proc w/o CC/MCC 
Major small and large bowel procedures w/ MCC 
Major small and large bowel procedures w CC 
Major small and large bowel procedures w/o CC/MCC 




Medicare Data Set—Medicare Volume (cont) 
Hernia procedures except inguinal and femoral w/ MCC 
Hernia procedures except inguinal and femoral w/ CC 
Hernia procedures except inguinal and femoral w/o CC/MCC 
Cholecystectomy except by laparoscope w/o c.d.e. w/ MCC 
Laparoscopic cholecystectomy w/o c.d.e. w/ MCC 
Laparoscopic cholecystectomy w/o c.d.e. w/ CC 
Laparoscopic cholecystectomy w/o c.d.e. w/o CC/MCC 
Spinal fusion except cervical w/ MCC 
Spinal fusion except cervical w/o MCC 
Bilateral or multiple major joint procs of lower extremity w/o MCC 
Revision of hip or knee replacement w/ MCC 
Revision of hip or knee replacement w/ CC 
Major joint replacement or reattachment of lower extremity w/ MCC 
Major joint replacement or reattachment of lower extremity w/o MCC 
Cervical spinal fusion w/ MCC 
Cervical spinal fusion w/ CC 
Cervical spinal fusion w/o CC/MCC 
Biopsies of musculoskeletal system and connective tissue w/ MCC 
Biopsies of musculoskeletal system and connective tissue w/ CC 
Biopsies of musculoskeletal system and connective tissue w/o CC/MCC 
Back and neck proc exc spinal fusion w CC/MCC or disc device/neurostim 
Back and neck proc exc spinal fusion w/o CC/MCC 
Major shoulder or elbow joint procedures w CC/MCC 
Other musculoskelet sys and conn tiss O.R. proc w MCC 
Diabetes w MCC 
Kidney and ureter procedures for neoplasm w MCC 
Kidney and ureter procedures for neoplasm w CC 
Kidney and ureter procedures for neoplasm w/o CC/MCC 
Kidney and ureter procedures for non-neoplasm w MCC 
Other kidney and urinary tract procedures w/ MCC 
Other kidney and urinary tract procedures w/ CC 
Other kidney and urinary tract procedures w/o CC/MCC 
Transurethral prostatectomy w/ CC/MCC 
Transurethral prostatectomy w/o CC/MCC 
Uterine and adnexa proc for non-malignancy w/o CC/MCC 
Female reproductive system reconstructive procedures 
Bilateral or multiple major joint procs of lower extremity w/ MCC 
Revision of hip or knee replacement w/o CC/MCC 
Transurethral procedures w/ MCC 
Major shoulder or elbow joint procedures w/o CC/MCC 
 
Medicare Data Set—Medicare Spending per Patient 
Measure ID Measure Name 
MSPB_1 






Medicare Data Set—Medicare Spending by Claim 
Period Claim Type 
1–3 days Prior to Index Hospital Admission Home Health Agency 
1–3 days Prior to Index Hospital Admission Hospice 
1–3 days Prior to Index Hospital Admission Inpatient 
1–3 days Prior to Index Hospital Admission Outpatient 
1–3 days Prior to Index Hospital Admission Skilled Nursing Facility 
1–3 days Prior to Index Hospital Admission Durable Medical Equipment 
1–3 days Prior to Index Hospital Admission Carrier 
Complete Episode Total 
 
Appendix A.5—Medicare Data Set Components—Timely and Effective Care 





Condition Measure Name 
HAM1 AMI_2 Heart Attack Patients Given Aspirin at Discharge 
HAM2 OP_4 Heart Attack Patients Given Aspirin at Arrival 
HAM3  Heart Attack Patients Given Beta Blocker at Arrival 
HAM4 AMI_8a 90 min Heart Attack Patients Given PCI within 120 Minutes Of 
Arrival 
HAM5   Heart Attack Patients Given Smoking Cessation 
Advice/Counseling 
HAM6   Heart Attack Patients Given ACE Inhibitor or ARB for 
Left Ventricular Systolic Dysfunction 
(LVSD) 
HAM7   Heart Attack Patients Given Thrombolytic Medication 
within 30 Minutes of Arrival 
HAM8   Heart Attack Patients Given Beta Blocker at Discharge 
HFM10  HF_1 Heart Failure Patients Given Discharge Instructions 
HFM11  HF_2 Heart Failure Patients Given Assessment of Left 
Ventricular Function (LVF) 
HFM13   Heart Failure Patients Given Smoking Cessation 
Advice/Counseling 
HFM9   Heart Failure Patients Given ACE Inhibitor or ARB for 
Left Ventricular Systolic Dysfunction 
(LVSD) 
PNM14  PN_6 Pneumonia Patients Given the Most Appropriate Initial 
Antibiotic(s) 
PNM15   Pneumonia Patients Given Initial Antibiotic(s) within 4 
Hours After Arrival 
PNM16   Pneumonia Patients Having a Blood Culture Performed 
Prior to First Antibiotic Received in Hospital 
PNM17   Pneumonia Patients Assessed and Given Pneumococcal 
Vaccination 
PNM18   Pneumonia Patients Given Smoking Cessation 
Advice/Counseling 
PNM19   Pneumonia Patients Given Oxygenation Assessment 
SIPM20  SCIP_INF_1 Surgical 
Infection 
Prevention 
Surgery Patients Who Received Preventative 
Antibiotic(s) One Hour Before Incision 
SIPM21  SCIP_INF_3 Surgical 
Infection 
Prevention 
Surgery Patients Whose Preventative 
Antibiotic(s) Are Stopped within 24 Hours 
After Surgery 
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Medicare Data Set—Timely and Effective Care - 2013 
Measure ID Measure Name 
AMI_10 Statin at discharge 
AMI_2 Aspirin prescribed at discharge 
AMI_7a Fibrinolytic therapy received within 30 minutes of hospital arrival 
AMI_8a Primary PCI received within 90 minutes of hospital arrival 
ED_1b ED1 
ED_2b ED2 
EDV Emergency Department volume 
HF_1 Discharge instructions 
HF_2 Evaluation of LVS function 
HF_3 ACEI or ARB for LVSD 
IMM_2 Immunization for influenza 
IMM_3_FAC_ADHPC
T Healthcare workers given influenza vaccination 
OP_1 Median time to fibrinolysis 
OP_18b OP 18 
OP_2 Fibrinolytic therapy received within 30 minutes of ED arrival 
OP_20 Door to diagnostic eval 
OP_21 Median time to pain med 
OP_22 Left before being seen 
OP_23 Head CT results 
OP_3b Median time to transfer to another facility for acute coronary intervention 
OP_4 Aspirin at arrival 
OP_5 Median time to ECG 
OP_6 Prophylactic antibiotic initiated within one hour prior to surgical incision 
OP_7 Prophylactic antibiotic selection for surgical patients 
PC_01 Percent of newborns whose deliveries were scheduled early (1–3 weeks 
early) when a scheduled delivery was not medically necessary 
PN_6 Initial antibiotic selection for CAP in immunocompetent patient 
SCIP_CARD_2 Surgery patients on a beta blocker prior to arrival who received a beta 
blocker during the perioperative period 
SCIP_INF_1 Prophylactic antibiotic received within 1 hour prior to surgical incision 
SCIP_INF_10 Surgery patients with perioperative temperature management 
SCIP_INF_2 Prophylactic antibiotic selection for surgical patients 
SCIP_INF_3 Prophylactic antibiotics discontinued within 24 hours after surgery end time 
SCIP_CARD_2 Surgery patients on a beta blocker prior to arrival who received a beta 
blocker during the perioperative period 
SCIP_INF_4 Cardiac surgery patients with controlled 6 a.m. postoperative blood glucose 
SCIP_INF_9 Postoperative urinary catheter removal 
SCIP_VTE_2 Surgery patients who received appropriate venous thromboembolism 
prophylaxis within 24 hours prior to or after surgery  
STK_1 Venous thromboembolism (VTE) prophylaxis 
STK_10 Assessed for rehabilitation 
STK_2 Discharged on antithrombotic therapy 
STK_3 Anticoagulation therapy for atrial fibrillation/flutter 
STK_4 Thrombolytic therapy 
STK_5 Antithrombotic therapy by end of hospital day 2 
STK_6 Discharged on statin medication 
STK_8 Stroke education 
VTE_1 Venous thromboembolism prophylaxis 
Table continues on next page 
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Medicare Data Set—Timely and Effective Care (cont) 
Measure ID Measure Name 
VTE_2 ICU venous thromboembolism prophylaxis 
VTE_3 Anticoagulation overlap therapy 
VTE_4 Unfractionated heparin with dosages/platelet count monitoring 
VTE_5 Warfarin therapy discharge instructions 
VTE_6 Incidence of potentially preventable VTE 
CAC_1 Relievers for inpatient asthma 
CAC_2 Systemic corticosteroids for inpatient asthma 
CAC_3 Home management plan of care document 
 
 
Appendix A.6—Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Reports 
Appendix A.6.1—CMS IME_GME Report 
Medicare Provider Number—PROVIDER_NUMBER 
Fiscal Year Start Date—FYB 
Fiscal Year End Date—FYE 
Claims Status—STATUS 
Demographics—HOSPITAL_Name, Street_Addr, Po_Box, City, State, Zip_Code, County 
Indirect Medical Education Payments—IME1, IME2, IME3 
Disproportionate Share Hospital Payments—DSH1, DSH2, DSH3 
DSH_SHARE_PERCENTAGE 






















Appendix A.6.2—CMS Case Mix Index Report 
Worksheet C, Part I (2010 forms) Form CMS-2552-10 
C000001_20000_00500—Column 5 = Total Costs 
C000001_20000_00600—Column 6 = Inpatient Charges 





Appendix A.6.3—FY_ _ _ FR Impact _File Report 
Provider Number Six character provider number; the first two digits are the state code 
Name Hospital Name—from OSCAR 
Geographic Labor Market Area The Geographic CBSA location for the provider 
Pre Reclass Labor Market Area  Pre-Reclass CBSA  
Payment Labor Market Area (for 
purposes of Capital and DSH) 
Payment CBSA (urban vs. rural) for purposes of determining capital & DSH payments 
Section 505 wage adjustment A “YES” denotes providers eligible to receive a wage index adjustment under Sec. 505  of P.L. 108-173 for FY 2008 
Section 505 eligible A “YES” denotes providers eligible to receive a wage index adjustment under Sec. 505 of P.L. 108-173 for FY 2008 
Section 401 hospital A “SEC401” denotes urban providers redesignated as rural under CFR 412.103—Sec 401 of BIPA 
Post Reclass Wage Index Post reclass wage index after applying the MGCRB reclassifications, the P.L. 108-173 Sec 505 adjustments where 
applicable for FY 2008 and reflects the application of the rural floor budget neutrality as proposed in this rule 
COLA Cost of living adj. for providers in AK & HI for operating PPS 
RESBED Used to determine IME factor for operating PPS payments 
SSA COUNTY CODE SSA state county code. SSA system for identifying county in which provider is geographically located. Can be used in 
conjunction with the msa/cbsa crosswalk file. 
HSP Rate 82/87/96 Hospital Specific Rate updated to FY2008 for SCH providers; 82/87 hospital specific rate for MDH providers 
updated to FY 2008 
RDAY Used to calculate the IME adjustment for Capital PPS 
BEDS From Medicare Cost Reports 
ADC Average Daily Census from Medicare Cost Report 
OPCCR From Provider Specific File; ratio of Medicare operating costs to Medicare covered charges 
CPCCR From Provider Specific File; ratio of Medicare capital costs to Medicare covered charges 
DSHPCT Disproportionate Share Percent as determined from cost report data & SSA data 
POST RECLASS Labor Market Area Post Reclass CBSA for FY 2008 
Puerto Rico Specific Post Reclass wage 
index 
Puerto Rico Specific post reclass wage index after applying the MGCRB reclassifications and the P.L. 108-173 Sec 505 
adjustments where applicable for FY 2008 
Provider Type Type of provider. Key: 0=IPPS; 7=RURAL REFERRAL CENTER; 8=INDIAN; 14=MEDICARE DEPENDENT SMALL 
RURAL HOSP; 15 MDH/RRC 16/17=SCH; 21/22=ESSENTIAL ACCESS CMTY HSP 
LUGAR Provider is located in a Lugar County as defined in 1886(d)(8)(B) 
RECLASS Reclass Status FY 2008: N: provider did not reclassify; W: provider reclassified for wage index ; L provider reclassified 
under 1886(d)(8)(B) of the SSA; S: provider redesignated as rural under Sec. 401 of BIPA 
BILLS Total cases for the provider from the FY2006 MEDPAR March 2007 Updt  
CASETA24 Transfer Adjusted Cases under Grouper V24 FY 2007 PAC trans policy 
TACMIV24 Transfer Adjusted Case Mix Index under Grouper V24  
CMIV24 Case Mix Index under Grouper V24 for SCH providers paid under their hospital specific rate 
CASETA25 Transfer Adjusted Cases under Grouper V25  
TACMIV25 Transfer Adjusted Case Mix Index under Grouper V25 
CMIV25 Case Mix Index under Grouper V25 for SCH providers paid under their hospital specific rate 
REGION 1=NEW ENGLAND; 2=MIDDLE ATLANTIC; 3=SOUTH ATLANTIC; 4=EAST NORTH CENTRAL; 5=EAST 
SOUTH CENTRAL; 6=WEST NORTH CENTRAL; 7=WEST SOUTH CENTRAL; 8-=MOUNTAIN; 9=PACIFIC; 
40=PUERTO RICO 
URGEO Large Urban, Other Urban or Rural designation of the providers geographic CBSA 
URSPA Urban or Rural designation based on payment CBSA 
TCHOP IME adjustment factor for Operating PPS 
TCHCP IME adjustment factor for Captial PPS 
Post Reclass GAF Post Reclass Geographic adjustment factor (GAF) for Capital FY 2008 
Puerto Rico Specific Post Reclass GAF Post Reclass GAF for Capital for Puerto Rico Providers FY 2008 
COLACP Cost of living adj. for providers in AK & HI for capital PPS 
DSHOPG Operating Disproportionate Share (DSH) adjustment 
DSHCPG Capital Disproportionate Share (DSH) adjustment 
OUT08F Estimated operating outlier payments as a percentage of the provider's federal operating PPS payments 
COUT08F Estimated capital outlier payments as a percentage of the provider's federal capital PPS payments 




Appendix B Correlation matrices 
 Appendix B.1 Correlation matrix—all variables 
Legend                            
Variable 















Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
























 Table 28 Correlation matrix—all variables 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
1 1.00                                                 
2 0.46 1.00                                               
3 0.44 0.43 1.00                                             
4 0.27 0.29 0.27 1.00                                           
5 -0.05 -0.13 -0.11 -0.05 1.00                                         
6 -0.01 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 0.58 1.00                                       
7 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.02 -0.08 -0.03 1.00                                     
8 -0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.09 -0.05 0.72 1.00                                   
9 -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.03 1.00                                 
10 -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.94 1.00                               
11 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.64 0.63 1.00                             
12 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.01 -0.06 -0.01 0.74 0.60 0.04 0.04 0.04 1.00                           
13 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.75 0.36 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.56 1.00                         
14 0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.25 -0.22 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.06 1.00                       
15 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.02 -0.08 -0.03 0.99 0.69 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.72 0.77 0.05 1.00                     
16 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.38 0.10 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.31 0.49 0.09 0.41 1.00                   
17 0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.08 -0.26 -0.07 -0.08 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.08 -0.04 0.31 -0.06 0.00 1.00                 
18 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.05 0.04 -0.10 -0.02 -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.19 -0.02 0.02 0.41 1.00               
19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .             
20 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 . 1.00           
21 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 0.10 0.07 -0.04 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 . -0.02 1.00         
22 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.03 0.09 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.05 -0.03 -0.02 0.10 0.09 . -0.01 -0.03 1.00       
23 -0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.06 -0.31 -0.08 0.19 0.19 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.17 0.09 0.04 0.18 0.02 -0.23 -0.17 . -0.03 -0.10 -0.07 1.00     
24 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.07 -0.05 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 0.09 -0.05 -0.06 0.01 0.02 . -0.03 -0.10 -0.07 -0.22 1.00   
25 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.14 0.07 -0.05 -0.06 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.05 0.03 0.10 0.09 . -0.05 -0.15 -0.11 -0.34 -0.34 1.00 
                           
 83 
Appendix B.2 Correlation matrix—all variables, excluding type of deal and acquirer type and percent change in 
inpatient charges 
Table 29 Highly correlated variables removed 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
1 1.00                                           
2 0.46 1.00                                         
3 0.44 0.43 1.00                                       
4 0.27 0.29 0.27 1.00                                     
5 -0.05 -0.13 -0.11 -0.05 1.00                                   
6 -0.01 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 0.58 1.00                                 
7 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.02 -0.08 -0.03 1.00                               
8 -0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.09 -0.05 0.72 1.00                             
9 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.38 0.10 1.00                           
10 -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.03 1.00                         
11 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.64 1.00                       
12 0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.25 -0.22 0.02 -0.01 0.09 -0.01 -0.01 1.00                     
13 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.02 -0.08 -0.03 0.99 0.69 0.41 0.05 0.04 0.05 1.00                   
14 0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.08 -0.26 -0.07 -0.08 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 0.31 -0.06 1.00                 
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16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .             
17 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 . 1.00           
18 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 0.10 0.07 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.06 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 . -0.02 1.00         
19 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.03 0.09 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.05 -0.03 0.10 0.09 . -0.01 -0.03 1.00       
20 -0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.06 -0.31 -0.08 0.19 0.19 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.18 -0.23 -0.17 . -0.03 -0.10 -0.07 1.00     
21 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.07 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.01 -0.02 0.09 -0.05 0.01 0.02 . -0.03 -0.10 -0.07 -0.22 1.00   
22 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.14 0.07 -0.05 -0.06 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.05 0.10 0.09 . -0.05 -0.15 -0.11 -0.34 -0.34 1.00 
 
 
Legend                        
Variable ami8a hf_1 pn_6 scip_inf_1 opccr cpccr acquired acqexp locacq chgincost chginoutpatient 
Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
            
Variable poppct_urban _IacqXpoppc_1 lg10beds gme acute govfed govlocal govstate proprietary volnpchurch volnpprivate 






Aguilera, R. V., & Dencker, J. C. (2004). The role of human resource management in 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions. The International Journal of Human 
Resource Management, 15(8), 1355-1370.  
Amercian Community Survey. (2005-2014). Retrieved from: 
https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/data/data-via-ftp.html 
Andrade, G., Mitchell, M., & Stafford, E. (2001). New Evidence and Perspectives on 
Mergers. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(2), 103-120.  Retrieved from 
http://ezproxy.gsu.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=tr
ue&db=bth&AN=4581971&site=eds-live 
Asquith, P., & Kim, E. H. (1982). The Impact of Merger Bids on the Participating Firm's 
Security Holders. Journal of Finance, 37(5), 1209-1228.  Retrieved from 
http://ezproxy.gsu.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=tr
ue&db=bth&AN=4654674&site=eds-live 
Azevedo, H., & Mateus, C. (2014). Cost effects of hospital mergers in Portugal. The 
European Journal Of Health Economics: HEPAC: Health Economics In 
Prevention And Care, 15(9), 999-1010. doi:10.1007/s10198-013-0552-6 
Barkema, H. G., & Schijven, M. (2008). TOWARD UNLOCKING THE FULL 
POTENTIAL OF ACQUISITIONS: THE ROLE OF ORGANIZATIONAL 
RESTRUCTURING. Academy of Management Journal, 51(4), 696-722. 
doi:10.5465/AMJ.2008.33665204 
 85 
Brown, J. T. C., Werling, K. A., Walker, B. C., Burgdorfer, R. J., & Shields, J. J. (2012). 
current trends in hospital mergers and acquisitions. hfm (Healthcare Financial 
Management), 66(3), 114-120.  Retrieved from 
http://ezproxy.gsu.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=tr
ue&db=fth&AN=73202963&site=eds-live 
Buono, A. F., & Bowditch, J. L. (2003). The human side of mergers and acquisitions: 
Managing collisions between people, cultures, and organizations: Beard Books. 
Carey, K. (2003). Hospital Cost Efficiency and System Membership, 25. 
Chatterjee, S. (1992). SOURCES OF VALUE IN TAKEOVERS: SYNERGY OR : 
RESTRUCTURING -- IMPLICATIONS FOR TARGET AND BIDDER FIRMS. 
Strategic Management Journal, 13(4), 267-286.  Retrieved from 
http://ezproxy.gsu.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=tr
ue&db=bth&AN=12492720&site=eds-live 
Cook, L. (2015). Researching Hospital Merger & Acquisition Trends. Billian's 
HealthData; Billian Publishing, Inc.  Retrieved from 
www.billianshealthdata.com/news/SiteNews/news_items/2015/Researching_Hosp
ital_Merger_and_Acquisition_Trends 
Crossan, M. M., Maurer, C. C., & White, R. E. (2011). Reflections on the 2009 AMR 
Decade Award: Do We have a Theory of Organizational Learning? Academy of 
Management Review, 36(3), 446-460. doi:10.5465/AMR.2011.61031806 
 86 
Cuellar, A. E., & Gertier, P. J. (2005). Market watch. How the expansion of hospital 
systems has affected consumers. Health Affairs, 24(1), 213-219.  Retrieved from 
http://ezproxy.gsu.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=tr
ue&db=rzh&AN=2005039131&site=eds-live 
d'Amours, É. (2010). Focus on people increases M&A success. CA Magazine, 143(3), 
10-10.  Retrieved from 
http://ezproxy.gsu.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=tr
ue&db=bth&AN=49385369&site=bsi-live 
Daniliuc, S., Bilson, C., & Shailer, G. (2014). The Interaction of Post-Acquisition 
Integration and Acquisition Focus in Relation to Long-Run Performance. 
International Review of Finance, 14(4), 587-612. doi:10.1111/irfi.12040 
Datta, D. K., Pinches, G. E., & Narayanan, V. K. (1992). FACTORS INFLUENCING 
WEALTH CREATION FROM MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: A META-
ANALYSIS. Strategic Management Journal, 13(1), 67-84.  Retrieved from 
http://ezproxy.gsu.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=tr
ue&db=bth&AN=12492892&site=eds-live 
Davis, K., Stremikis, K., Squires, D., & Schoen, C. (2014). Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: 
How Performance of the U.S. Health Care System Compares Internationally. The 
Commonwealth Fund.  Retrieved from http://www.resbr.net.br/wp-
content/uploads/historico/Espelhoespelhomeu.pdf 
 87 
Dranove, D., Garthwaite, C., Li, B., & Ody, C. (2015). Investment subsidies and the 
adoption of electronic medical records in hospitals. Journal of Health Economics, 
44, 309-319. doi:10.1016/j.jhealeco.2015.10.001 
Dranove, D., & Lindrooth, R. (2003). Hospital consolidation and costs: another look at 
the evidence. Journal of Health Economics, 22(6), 983-997. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2003.05.001 
Gomes, E., Angwin, D. N., Weber, Y., & Tarba, S. Y. (2013). Critical Success Factors 
through the Mergers and Acquisitions Process: Revealing Pre- and Post-M&A 
Connections for Improved Performance. Thunderbird International Business 
Review, 55(1), 13-35. doi:10.1002/tie.21521 
Goodwin, J. S., Jinhyung, L., & Yong-Fang, K. (2013). The effect of electronic medical 
record adoption on outcomes in US hospitals. BMC Health Services Research, 
13(1), 1-7. doi:10.1186/1472-6963-13-39 
Government. (2003). Medicare Claims Processing Manual: Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services. 
Haleblian, J., Devers, C. E., McNamara, G., Carpenter, M. A., & Davison, R. B. (2009). 
Taking Stock of What We Know About Mergers and Acquisitions: A Review and 
Research Agenda. Journal of Management, 35(3), 469-502. 
doi:10.1177/0149206308330554 
Hansen, R. G., & Lott Jr, J. R. (1996). Externalities and Corporate Objectives in a World 
with Diversified Shareholder/Consumers. Journal of Financial & Quantitative 
 88 
Analysis, 31(1), 43-68.  Retrieved from 
http://ezproxy.gsu.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=tr
ue&db=bth&AN=9606203547&site=ehost-live&scope=site 
Harrison, T. D. (2011). Do Mergers Really Reduce Costs? Evidence from Hospitals. 
Economic Inquiry, 49(4), 1054-1069. 
doi:http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291465-
7295/issues 
Hayford, T. B. (2012). The Impact of Hospital Mergers on Treatment Intensity and 
Health Outcomes. Health Services Research, 47(3pt1), 1008-1029. 
doi:10.1111/j.1475-6773.2011.01351.x 




Ho, V., & Hamilton, B. H. (2000). Hospital mergers and acquisitions: does market 
consolidation harm patients? Journal of Health Economics, 19, 767-791. 
doi:10.1016/S0167-6296(00)00052-7 
Johnson, J. P., Lenartowicz, T., & Apud, S. (2006). Cross-Cultural Competence in 
International Business: Toward a Definition and a Model. Journal of 




Kane, J. (2012). Healthcare Costs: How the U.S. Compares with Other Countries.  
Retrieved from PBS.org 
King, D. R., Dalton, D. R., Daily, C. M., & Covin, J. G. (2004). META-ANALYSES OF 
POST-ACQUISITION PERFORMANCE: INDICATIONS OF UNIDENTIFIED 
MODERATORS. Strategic Management Journal, 25(2), 187-200. 
doi:10.1002/smj .37I 
KPMG. (2015). 2015 M&A Outlook Survey Report.  Retrieved from 
https://www.kpmg.com/US/en/services/Advisory/transactions-and-
restructuring/Documents/kpmg-ma-outlook-2015-web.pdf 
Krishnan, R. A., & Krishnan, H. (2003). Effects of hospital mergers and acquisitions on 
prices. Journal of Business Research, 56(8), 647-656. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0148-2963(01)00309-5 
Malatesta, P. H. (1983). The Wealth Effect of Merger Activity and the Objective 
Functions of Merging Firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 11(1-4), 155-181. 
doi:http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/0304405X 
Marmenout, K. (2011). Peer interaction in mergers: Evidence of collective rumination. 
Human Resource Management, 50(6), 783-808. doi:10.1002/hrm.20458 
 90 
Mayo, E. (1933). The human problems of an industrial civilization: New York, The 
Macmillan company, 1933. 
McKell, D. C., & Quadri, S. K. (1984). The effects of heat stress on plasma 
catecholamines in the dog. Physiologist, 27, 241.  
Mitchell, M. L., & Mulherin, J. H. (1996). The impact of industry shocks on takeover and 
restructuring activity. Journal of Financial Economics, 41(2), 193-229. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(95)00860-H 
Moeller, S. B., Schlingemann, F. P., & Stulz, R. M. (2003). Do Shareholders of 
Acquiring Firms Gain from Acquisitions? (NBER Working Paper No. w9523). 
Retrieved June 1, 2015 from http://ssrn.com/abstract=385023.  
Munro, D. (2015). U.S. Healthcare Spending On Track to Hit $10,000 Per Person This 
Year. Forbes Magazine, Pharma & Healthcare.  Retrieved from 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/danmunro/2015/01/04/u-s-healthcare-spending-on-
track-to-hit-10000-per-person-this-year/print/ 
Mutter, R. L., Romano, P. S., & Wong, H. S. (2011). The Effects of US Hospital 
Consolidations on Hospital Quality. International Journal of the Economics of 
Business, 18(1), 109-126. doi:10.1080/13571516.2011.542961 
Packer-Tursman, J. (2015). M&A CLIMBS UNDER REFORM. Managed Healthcare 




Paulus, R. A., Davis, K., & Steele, G. D. (2008). Continuous Innovation In Health Care: 
Implications Of The Geisinger Experience. Health Affairs, 27(5), 1235-1245. 
doi:10.1377/hlthaff.27.5.1235 
Pearson, J. T., Critz, C., McKell, D., Enriquez, J., Gregory, K., Brady, K., . . . Casey, T. 
(1998). Pharmacologic Hemoglobin Reversal: The Importance of Lipid 
Intermediaries and the Proposed Involvement of the Camp and 
Phosphatidylinositol Second Messenger Systems. Hemoglobin, 22(3), 245-261.  
Pearson, J. T., Enriquez, J., Critz, C., McKell, D., Casey, K., Brady, K., & Baker, T. 
(1994). A rodent model for hemoglobin switching utilizing high performance 
liquid chromatography. . Hemoglobin,  [0363-0269], 18(6), 401-412.  
Reuters. (2007). Community Health to Buy Triad Hospitals for $5.1 Billion. The New 
York Times. Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/20/business/20health.html?_r=0 
Robeznieks, A. (2015). GEISINGER’S SECOND CENTURY OF INNOVATION. 
Modern Healthcare, 45(7), 0022-0022 0021p.  Retrieved from 
http://ezproxy.gsu.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=tr
ue&db=rzh&AN=103762781&site=eds-live 
Roethlisberger, F. J., Dickson, W. J., & Wright, H. A. (1939). Management and the 
worker; an account of a research program conducted by the Western electric 
company, Hawthorne works, Chicago: Cambridge, Mass., Harvard university 
press, 1939. 
 92 
Romano, P. S., & Balan, D. J. (2011). A Retrospective Analysis of the Clinical Quality 
Effects of the Acquisition of Highland Park Hospital by Evanston Northwestern 
Healthcare. International Journal of the Economics of Business, 18(1), 45-64. 
doi:10.1080/13571516.2011.542955 
Salter, M. S., & Weinhold, W. A. (1981). Choosing compatible acquisitions. Harvard 
Business Review, 59(1), 117.  Retrieved from 
http://ezproxy.gsu.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=tr
ue&db=edb&AN=3867880&site=eds-live 
Sanders, C. (2015). Experts Predict Another Year of Robust Healthcare M&A. Medical 
News, Inc.  Retrieved from http://www.medicalnewsinc.com/experts-predict-
another-year-of-robust-healthcare-m-a-cms-594 
Schweiger, D. M., & Denisi, A. S. (1991). COMMUNICATION WITH EMPLOYEES 
FOLLOWING A MERGER: A LONGITUDINAL FIELD EXPERIMENT. 
Academy of Management Journal, 34(1), 110-135. doi:10.2307/256304 
Seo, M.-G., & Hill, N. S. (2005). Understanding the Human Side of Merger and 
Acquisition: An Integrative Framework. The Journal of Applied Behavioral 












Seth, A., Song, K. P., & Pettit, A. R. (2002). VALUE CREATION AND 
DESTRUCTION IN CROSS-BORDER ACQUISITIONS: AN EMPIRICAL 
ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN ACQUISITIONS OF U.S. FIRMS. Strategic 
Management Journal, 23(10), 921-940. doi:10.1002/smj.264 
Shrivastava, P. (1986). Post-Merger Integration. Journal of Business Strategy, 7, 65-76.  
Siehl, C., & Smith, D. (1990). Avoiding the Loss of a Gain: Retaining Top Managers in 
an Acquisition. Human Resource Management, 29(2), 167-185.  
Spang, H. R., Arnould, R. J., & Bazzoli, G. J. (2009). The effect of non-rural hospital 
mergers and acquisitions: An examination of cost and price outcomes. The 
Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 49(2), 323-342. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.qref.2007.01.003 
Stahl, G. K., Angwin, D. N., Very, P., Gomes, E., Weber, Y., Tarba, S. Y., . . . Sarala, R. 
M. (2013). Sociocultural Integration in Mergers and Acquisitions: Unresolved 
Paradoxes and Directions for Future Research. Thunderbird International 
Business Review, 55(4), 333-356. doi:10.1002/tie.21549 
 94 
Thompson , A. (2009). The Effect of Hospital Mergers on Inpatient Prices: A Case Study 
of the New Hanover-Cape Fear Transaction. Bureau of Economics, Working 
Paper 295.  Retrieved from 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/effect-hospital-mergers-
inpatient-prices-case-study-new-hanover-cape-fear-transaction/wp295.pdf 
Thomson-Reuters. (2012). Mergers and Acquisitions Review. 
http://dmi.thomsonreuters.com/Content/Files/4Q2012_MA_Financial_Advisory_
Review.pdf 
Thomson-Reuters. (2013). Merger and Acquisition Review. 
http://www.pwc.es/es/servicios/transacciones/assets/thomson-reuters-mergers-
and-acquisitions-review-2013.pdf.  
Tuch, C., & O'Sullivan, N. (2007). The impact of acquisitions on firm performance: A 
review of the evidence. International Journal of Management Reviews, 9(2), 141-
170. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2370.2007.00206.x 
US Inflation Calculator. (2016). CoinNews.  Retrieved from 
http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/inflation/historical-inflation-rates/ 
Vestring, T., Rouse, T., & Rovit, S. (2004). Integrate Where It Matters. MIT Sloan 




Viegas-Pires, M. (2013). Multiple Levels of Culture and Post M&A Integration: A 
Suggested Theoretical Framework. Thunderbird International Business Review, 
55(4), 357-370. doi:10.1002/tie.21550 
Vogt, W. B. T., R.J. (2006). How has hospital  consolidation affected price and quality of 
patient care. New Brunswick: Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, Research 
Synthesis Report, 9(2), 983-997.  
Whitehouse, S. (2012). Healthcare Delivery System Reform and The Patient Protection & 
Affordable Care Act. A Report from Senator Sheldon Whitehouse for the U.S. 
Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions.  Retrieved from 
http://www.whitehouse.senate.gov/download/?id=a8ae94dc-d490-47a1-bd61-
a11c5f161613&download=1 
Xiao, N., Sharman, R., Singh, R., Singh, G., Danzo, A., & Rao, H. R. (2012). 
“Meaningful Use” of ambulatory EMR: Does it improve the quality and 
efficiency of health care? Health Policy and Technology, 1, 28-34. 
doi:10.1016/j.hlpt.2012.01.009 
Zuckerman, S., Hadley, J., & Iezzoni, L. (1994). Measuring hospital efficiency with 








Dawn McKell was born at Brooklyn-Jewish hospital in Brooklyn, NY, on June 5, 
1955 and was the second child of Clarine Lorraine Douglas-Gilfillan and Edward Lionel 
Gilfillan. Her elder sister, Sandy A. Gilfillan-Cooper, resides in Virginia and is her only 
sibling. The first 20 years of Dawn’s life were spent in the boroughs of Brooklyn, 
Manhattan, and Queens, where she attended catholic schools from first grade through her 
sophomore year of high school, when she transferred to public high school and graduated 
in 1973. On March 15, 1975, at 19 years of age, she married Paul McKell, who had 
recently joined the US Army. Shortly after marrying, she moved to Korea where she 
lived with her husband for 14 months before he was reassigned to Savannah, Georgia, 
where they welcomed their first child, Brian, into the world on October 21, 1976. Their 
second child, Bianca, was born on June 23, 1978, also in Savannah. Another 
reassignment took the family to Wiesbaden, Germany, where they lived for three years. 
During this assignment, Dawn worked as a Medical Technician in the radioimmunoassay 
section of a US military testing laboratory on Wiesbaden air base and eventually 
becoming the section supervisor. The family was reassigned to Fort Riley, Kansas, and, 
during this tour of her husband’s duty, Dawn worked as a Medical Technician in a 
neuroendocrinology research laboratory in the Anatomy and Physiology Department at 
Kansas State University’s veterinary medicine complex, performing research and 
assisting with grant proposals under the direction of Dr. S.K. Quadri. During this time, 
Dawn was the lead author of an abstract (McKell & Quadri, 1984) that she presented in 
poster format at a conference at Kansas University in Topeka. Upon moving from Kansas 
to El Paso, Texas, due to another reassignment, Dawn pursued her Bachelor of Science 
degree in Medical Technology, graduating magna cum laude from the University of 
 97 
Texas at El Paso in 1988. Post-graduation in El Paso, she worked in two clinical hospital 
laboratories, Providence Hospital and William Beaumont Army Medical Center, 
respectively, which culminated in a rise to manager of the latter’s Chemistry Department. 
During her tenure at William Beaumont Army Medical Center, Dawn participated in 
research related to fetal hemoglobin, which produced two published articles that she co-
authored (Pearson et al., 1998; Pearson et al., 1994). Her career path then took her into 
diagnostic clinical laboratory sales; this began as an entry-level technical position 
attached to sales and culminated in an Integrated Healthcare Network Director position at 
the company, where she worked for 17 years, serving in various positions including 
direct sales for multiple product lines and sales management. She then took a hiatus from 
the work environment to pursue post-graduate study in the form of a Master’s in Business 
Administration with a concentration in Healthcare Administration from South University, 
graduating magna cum laude in 2013. Dawn chose to pursue an Executive Doctorate in 
Business from Georgia State University in 2013, and returned to a clinical diagnostic 
sales career in 2014 while continuing her studies. She currently serves as the National 
Manager of Group Purchasing Organizations (GPOs), Integrated Delivery Networks 
(IDNs), and Corporate Accounts for a clinical diagnostic instrument manufacturer. Dawn 
resides at 11491 Carl Parker Rd., Hampton, GA 30228, which is just outside of the 
Atlanta metro area. 
